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Comments
Giving the Boot to the Long-Arm:
Analysis of Post-International Shoe
Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction
Decisions, Emphasizing Unrealized
Implications of the "Minimum
Contacts" Test*
INTRODUCTION
The mainstream concerning state assertions of personal ju-
risdiction is a rather muddy current, there being little agreement
regarding when personal jurisdiction can be asserted over non-
residents. All jurisdictions agree that the "minimum contacts"
test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington' governs assertions
of personal jurisdiction, 2 but it is far from clear exactly what
* The author thanks all who have offered criticisms of previous drafts of this
work, but conveys special thanks to Douglas W. Cox, whose many patient listenings
helped these ideas to grow, and to Professor Robert G. Schwemm, whose encouragement
and support made the ordeals of publication bearable.
326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the Court wrote:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
2 For example, according to the Fifth Circuit, questions of personal jurisdiction
are easily assessed against, "the well-established framework for assessing whether an
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment".
Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). The Spade-
man court failed to find personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a contract
dispute, despite the fact that: partial performance was to be in the forum state, the
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elements of the "minimum contacts" analysis are dispositive in
a particular case.3 The four most recent Burger Court personal
contract was partly negotiated and/or made in the forum state, defendant had extensively
communicated with plaintiff in the forum state, choice of law contract provisions
indicated forum law might be applied to the litigation, and defendant had partially
exploited the forum market. Id. at 1192-96. The Spademan decision has been relied
upon extensively in a more recent Fifth Circuit Texas decision. See Colwell Realty Inv.,
Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Ariz., Inc., 785 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1986) (contacts between
defendant as general partner of Arizona limited partnership and state of Texas insuffi-
cient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction).
Other Fifth Circuit decisions, however, have upheld jurisdiction on fairly minimal
forum contacts. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 775 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.
1985) (.3% defendant software sales to Louisiana, no advertising specifically directed to
Louisiana, no witnesses in Louisiana, suit involving trade practices of two foreign
corporations-Held: jurisdiction valid); Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp.,
744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984) (two castings which indirectly found their way into
construction project in Louisiana sufficient to validate jurisdiction for products liability
suit). Perhaps the difference in the type litigation involved is sufficient to explain the
divergent Spademan and Vault Corp. holdings. In a related context, however, the Fifth
Circuit has more frankly acknowledged that "our opinions on the issue of personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases, '[]ike a Tower of Babel ... spoke in irreconciliable
voices,' " Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987)
(quoting DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1983)). Point
Landing illustrates the division within the Fifth Circuit regarding personal jurisdiction,
since in this en banc decision, six of the fifteen justices dissented on the issue of how
minimum contacts should be determined for an alien corporation in a federal question
case.
3 Among the questions that have perplexed commentators in the wake of Supreme
Court decisions which seem to tack in different directions: Were the contacts in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) sufficient to establish
jurisdiction in light of Shaffer v. Heitner's, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), reformulation of in
rem jurisdiction, or was Mullane an example of jurisdiction by necessity? Did Traveler's
Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), and McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), imply that plaintiff necessity of a forum could play a role in
"minimum contacts" analysis? Why did state sovereignty and federalism concerns sud-
denly become prominent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), only to disappear
in Shaffer, then re-emerge in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), before disappearing again in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)?
Well-reasoned articles, comprehensively analyzing the decisions and arriving at
differing theories of jurisdiction, include: Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77 (why emphasis should
be on defendant contacts); Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. Rav. 227 (1967) (flexible minimum contacts approach
necessary, with emphasis on interrelation between substantive nature of claim and
amount and quality of contacts); Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L. RE,. 411 (1981) (venue and personal
[VoL. 75
1987] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 887
jurisdiction decisions,4 like previous Court pronouncements, have
jurisdiction concerns nearly identical; complicated formula provided for when jurisdiction
appropriate); Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IoWA L. Rv.
1015 (1983) (state sovereignty concerns should be deemphasized); Hay, Judicial Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign-Country Corporate Defendants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63
OR. L. REv. 431 (1984) (whether alien defendant contacts should aggregate within the
nation or only within forum state; whether jurisdiction by necessity is a possibility when
alien defendants are involved); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241 (minimum contacts made workable by particularization in
special areas, and adding notice provisions; Pennoyer analysis should be completely
abandoned); Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUi. L.
REv. 960 (1981) (same level and type contacts constitutionally required for assertions of
personal jurisdiction as for choice of law); Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. RE,. 569 (1958) (various factors must be weighed
on case by case basis); Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction
Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV.
769 (1982) (state sovereignty concerns irrelevant to personal jurisdiction; impacts on
choice of law; fairness to defendant is key); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. Ray. 85 (1983) (more flexible minimum contacts test needed,
fairness to defendant more important than federalism; choice of law standard should be
applied to personal jurisdiction; aggregation of nationwide contacts permissible if alien
corporations involved); McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest
Analysis, 35 VND. L. REv. 1 (1982) (party convenience should be primary considera-
tion); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the
Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EmoRY L.J. 729 (1981) (transient presence
jurisdiction should be abolished; two tier approach of contacts and determination of
reasonableness advocated; first tier should not inquire into defendant's subjective intent);
Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981) (federalism concerns should not influence personal
jurisdiction decisions; party convenience should be determinative factor); Rheinstein,
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. Ray. 775 (1955) (focus upon
divorce jurisdiction; extent of constitutional limits on state's ability to regulate conduct
outside its boundaries; internal effect of decrees that exceed jurisdiction); Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978) (whether lower
level of contacts needed for quasi in rem jurisdiction; why plaintiff convenience should
play a role in jurisdiction; interrelation of jurisdiction with choice of laws); Traynor, Is
This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 Tax. L. REv. 657 (1958) (non-mechanical rules needed
for both personal jurisdiction and choice of laws; emphasis on legitimate state interests);
von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U.L. REv. 279 (1983) (acceptable jurisdictional bases for fairness vs. power theory of
jurisdiction; interrelation with choice of laws); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HA~iv. L. Rv. 1121 (1966) (importance of specific
vs. general jurisdiction; interrelation between personal jurisdiction and choice of laws,
plaintiff convenience); Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction
of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. Ray. 485 (1984) (contacts abandoned in
favor of sole standard of fairness to defendant); Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal
Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 861 (1978) (three part test of contacts,
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been interpreted non-uniformly by commentators5 and lower
courts.6 The first Rehnquist Court personal jurisdiction decision7
convenience, and purposeful beneficial availment).
The United States Supreme Court has cited with seeming approval portions of the
articles by Brilmayer, Hazard, Lilly, Traynor, and von Mehren and Trautman. See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8 & 9, 417 (1984);
433 U.S. at 199, 205.
4 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
408; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (class action
suit which includes some general discussion of personal jurisdiction).
See, e.g., Knudsen, Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros and Burger King-Interna-
tional Shoe's Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. Mum L. REsv. 809 (1985) (cases portend
increased balancing of plaintiffs' and defendants' interests, but leave much distressing
old theory and language intact); Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Contacts:
Justice Brennan "Has it His Way," 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 89 (1986) (Burger King
portends disappearance of two stage test and increased reliance on plaintiff interests);
Note, Consistency in the Due Process Requirement?: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine and
Calder v. Jones, 18 CREIGHToN L. Ray. 125 (1984) (cases implement Shaffer test
becoming sole method for determining fairness of jurisdiction); Note, Jurisdiction in
Single Contract Cases: Burger King Sets the Standard, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 645 (1986)
(Burger King decision clarifies that physical contact not necessary and more than single
contract necessary, but Burger King test too rigid as applied and leaves too many
questions unanswered); Note, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz: Flexibility v. Predicta-
bility in In Personam Jurisdiction, 64 N.C. L. Ray. 881 (1986) (contradictions inherent
in Court's flexible standard will lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results); Note,
Quest For a Bright Line Personal Jurisdiction Rule in Contract Disputes-Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 61 WASH. L. REv. 703 (1986) (decisions indicate willingness to
adopt more predictable rules; author proposes rules felt consistent with Court's direc-
tion).
" Post-Burger King Federal Courts of Appeals do not agree on how or whether
the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions add anything new to personal jurisdiction
analysis. See, e.g., Colwell Realty Investments v. Triple T Inns, 785 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir.
1986) (Burger King affirms old law; purposeful availment emphasized; See also supra
note 2); Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Calder and Burger King mark significant change; purposeful directing more
important than purposeful availing; burden of proof re: reasonableness can shift to
defendant); Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986) (majority:
applying two stage test for reasonableness, contacts at stage one insufficient; dissent:
majority misapplies general jurisdiction test to this specific jurisdiction case, stage one
satisfied, defendant cannot overcome shifted burden of proof at stage two); Dalmau
Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (systematic and continuous
contacts required for any assertion of jurisdiction); Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt,
779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985) (transient presence jurisdiction upheld; see also infra notes
16-20 and accompanying text); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 775 F.2d 638 (5th
Cir. 1985) (Keeton authorizes jurisdiction over corporation even if forum activities are
small percentage of national sales); Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Products Co., 766 F.2d
105 (3rd Cir. 1985) (purposeful direction of contract activities into forum triggers specific
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produced three plurality opinions which leave in doubt important
issues regarding personal jurisdiction over manufacturers in
product liability suits. 8 To clarify the confusion, this Comment
jurisdiction); Madison Consulting Group v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir.
1985) (majority: "contract-plus" jurisdiction requirement upheld, forum performance
alone insufficient, who solicits can be key factor; concurrence: performance alone can
confer jurisdiction if deliberately sought by defendant in forum state).
The situation is similarly confused among state tribunals. See, e.g., Ex Parte Newco
Mfg. v. Southern Ry., 481 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 1985) (Burger King specific jurisdiction test
and rationale validates general jurisdiction over clamp manufacturer in wrongful death/
products liability action); Frazer v. McGowan, 502 A.2d 905 (Conn. 1986) (Rhode Island
hospital's and its doctors' solicitation of patients in Connecticut validates personal
jurisdiction over the hospital for malpractice suit filed by Connecticut plaintiff); First
United Bank v. First Nati. Bank, 340 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. 1986) (Mississippi bank's for-
warding of check to Georgia for collection through normal banking channels did not
fulfill Burger King "purposeful directing" requirement). Fryar v. Westside Habilitation
Center, 479 So. 2d 883 (La. 1985) (specific jurisdiction over third party corporate
bondbroker/employee upheld on basis of his knowledge of effects in forum of his
limited and long distance forum contacts); Ben's Marine Sales v. Sleek Craft Boats, 502
A.2d 808 (R.I. 1985) ("stream of commerce" rationale applies also to contract cases;
delivery of boat to Rhode Island by California manufacturer pursuant to contract
probably provided sufficient contacts to validate specific jurisdiction; additional contacts
obviate need to decide whether single contact alone is sufficient); South Dakota v.
American Bankers Ins., 374 N.W.2d 609, 611-13 (S.D. 1985) (collection of premium
payments on insurance policies acquired by foreign corporation not licensed in S. Dakota
provides sufficient contacts for jurisdiction on suit to collect taxes related to those
collections); Masada Investment Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1985) (personal
jurisdiction upheld over third party Texas attorney for malpractice claim where attorney
allegedly misdrew deed for multi-million dollar Tennessee real estate venture); Synergetics
v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) (specific jurisdiction upheld over
foreign corporation on basis of director's limited communications and visits to Utah
involving negotiation of agreement which was signed in Canada involving California,
Illinois, Canadian and Utah business entities).
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
Although all nine Justices agreed personal jurisdiction should be denied on the
particular facts before the Court, the three opinions split over whether the stage one
minimum contacts hurdle was cleared. Justice O'Connor, speaking for four Justices,
ruled that minimum contacts did not exist; Justice Brennan, for four Justices, argued
that the stage one minimum contacts hurdle had been cleared, but that the stage two
fairness hurdle had not. Justice Stevens, for three Justices, asserted that the minimum
contacts test was inapplicable, but that he would probably have found purposeful
availment such as to fulfill the minimum contacts test had the issue been necessary to
his decision. Since the particular suit in Asahi was for indemnity rather than products
liability, and since Justice Stevens' opinion was narrowly qualified, the Asahi decision
leaves unclear how future products liability suits should be decided. For a more detailed
analysis of the Asahi decision, emphasizing how a proper appreciation for the interre-
latedness of choice of law and personal jurisdiction could have produced a less ambiguous
decision, see Cox, The Interrelatedness of Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law:
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
first analyzes these decisions and concludes that the Court is
fashioning a two-stage test for personal jurisdiction that has
different requirements and burdens of proof at each stage.
Because the Court's updated analysis in reality is only a
more full realization of the implications of the "minimum con-
tacts" test adopted over forty years ago, this Comment also
urges courts and commentators to carry the logical implications
of "minimum contacts" jurisdiction yet further and apply tests
based solely on contacts. A theoretical framework is provided
for discarding baggage accumulated under any theory other than
"minimum contacts." The first piece of jurisdictional baggage
specifically discarded under the framework is state long-arm
statutes, since these statutes are not needed for assertions of
personal jurisdiction, deflect from inquiry into the true bases of
jurisdiction, and are sometimes unconstitutional. This Comment
concludes by briefly identifying other areas where modification
would be needed if thorough-going minimum contacts analysis
were applied.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF THE "MINIMUM CONTACTS" TEST
A. Full Pennoyer Power vs. Limited International Shoe Interest
The International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 adoption of the
"minimum contacts" test of personal jurisdiction was a complete
abandonment' ° of Pennoyer v. Neff's" jurisdictional frame-
Forging New Theory Through Asahi Metal, to be published 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. (Fall
1987).
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
,0 Many able hands have traced the history of the abandonment of a territorial
theory for one based on party contacts and state interest. The Supreme Court itself has
periodically engaged in fairly extensive historical review of prior decisions. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 196-206 (1977); 326 U.S. at 316-18. See also supra note 3 for law review articles
with extensive discussion of the shift in theories; Kao, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary
Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 1147 (urisdictional theory of particular period is well adapted to societal needs of
that time).
1 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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work. 12 As Shaffer v. Heitner13 later proclaimed: "We therefore
conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny." 14 The Court had waited thirty years to
use International Shoe's "minimum contacts" test to invalidate
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction's in Shaffer, and several more years
may pass before the Court explicitly invalidates transient pres-
ence jurisdiction. 16 Nevertheless, "minimum contacts" logic re-
11 The International Shoe Court possibly did not realize the full sweep of its
"minimum contacts" substitution. In the quotation that gave birth to the "minimum
contacts" test, the Court left intact certain elements of territorial jurisdiction by including
the qualifying phrase "if he be not present within the territory of the forum." 326 U.S.
at 316 (emphasis added). The Court also did not distinguish clearly between specific
versus general jurisdiction. See 326 U.S. at 318-20. Ehrenzweig mistakenly appeared to
believe a decade after Shoe that the analysis was limited to corporations. See Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YAtE L.J. 289, 311-312 (1956). Thus, a court or commentator may champion a new
theory w ithout realizing all the implications of abandoning one theory for another. The
implications were more fully realized by later Courts, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ("minimum contacts" applies to general jurisdiction)
and Shaffer ("minimum contacts" applies to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction). This Comment
argues that there are still more implications to be realized.
11 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
1" Id. at 212 (emphasis added). If any doubt remained that the Shaffer discussion
and analysis would be applied outside the quasi-in-rem and corporate areas, this disap-
peared when the Shaffer test of "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation," id. at 204, was immediately picked up by the Court and applied to other
contexts. E.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320. 327 (1980). See also infra note 44
(examples from recent Court decisions). The Shaffer language has been used in lower
courts as the appropriate specific jurisdiction test. See, e.g., Wallace v. Herron, 778
F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1642 (1986); Patterson v. Dietze,
Inc., 764 F.2d 1145, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985); Madison Consulting Group v. South Carolina,
752 F.2d 1193, 1196 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985).
,1 Quasi-in-rem is here used to refer to that type of jurisdiction where
the property which ... serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is
completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action. Thus, although the
presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence
of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence
of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction. If those
other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to have
jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.
433 U.S. at 209.
V- Transient presence jurisdiction is "It]he dogma that ... has it that in personam
jurisdiction of an individual defendant can be acquired by mere physical service of
process, even in a forum where neither plaintiff nor defendant resides and which has
no connection with the cause of action." Ehrenzweig, supra note 12, at 289. One of the
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quires that such "random," "fortuitous" or "attenuated"
contacts 17 not confer jurisdiction.5  Both pure quasi-in-rem and
transient presence jurisdiction are holdovers from the discredited
territorial sovereignty mentality that gave rise to the Pennoyer
holding. That it took until 1977 for the former to be rejected, 19
and that the latter still has not been condemned universally,
20
most famous cases validating transient presence jurisdiction is Grace v. MacArthur, 170
F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant served with process while flying over Arkansas
airspace). In that case, as in most transient presence cases, the defendant had other
contacts with the forum that was attempting to assert jurisdiction over him. Thus,
discarding a theory of transient presence jurisdiction does not necessarily mean lack of
jurisdiction in particular cases, only a lack of confusion as to why there is jurisdiction.
As stated in Shaffer: "It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types of actions
which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any
assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard." 433
U.S. at 208. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1138. Because an
improper theory can lead to results usually not inconsistent with application of the
proper theory, the improper theory is allowed to live beyond its useful life.
17 471 U.S. at 475 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984) and World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299).
18 Ehrenzweig's condemnation of transient presence jurisdiction is still among the
most persuasive. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 12. See also Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.J. 533, 583-
85; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1177-79. Commentators after Shaffer
nearly unanimously condemn transient presence jurisdiction and believe that Shaffer
requires its abolition. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the
Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VuX. L. Ray. 38 (1979); Fry, Shaffer
v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26
EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue
Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CoRN= L. REv. 564 (1981); Lacy, Personal
Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. Ray. 505
(1978); Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under
Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. Rav. 1 (1984); Posnak, supra note 3; Sedier, Judicial
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L.
R v. 1031 (1978); Silberman, supra note 3; Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q.
273; Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-
Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565 (1979); Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer
v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGs CONsT. L.Q. 15 (1978); Comment, Minimum Contacts Analysis
of In Personam Jurisdiction Over Individuals Based on Presence, 33 ARK. L. REv. 159
(1979). But see infra note 20.
1" E.g., Shaffer: "The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is
anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an
ancient form without substantial modem justification. Its continued acceptance would
serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defend-
ant." 433 U.S. at 212.
10 Recent casebooks continue to include transient presence jurisdiction as a possi-
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shows that not all courts and commentators have discarded the
Pennoyer framework.
21
Under the territorial framework, all assertions of personal
jurisdiction were essentially plenary.2 With the defendant or his
proxy validly before it, a court was free to adjudicate all the
defendant's rights regarding any controversy with the plaintiff.2
A state's power over persons and property within its territorial
borders was believed self-evident, and therefore no statute was
required for jurisdiction. 24 The only constitutional limit upon a
bility for valid in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., J. CoUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A.
MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 151 (4th ed. 1985); W. REEsE & M. ROSENBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (8th ed. 1984). Several post-Shaffer opinions also find transient
presence jurisdiction legitimate. E.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1985); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1114 (1979); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Humphrey v. Lang-
ford, 273 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. 1980); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d
285, 286-87 (Wis. 1979).
Amusement Equipment illustrates the tenacity and arbitrariness of the doctrine.
Although the Amusement Equipment litigation related to a contact of the defendant
employee and his corporation with New Orleans, 779 F.2d at 266; cf. supra note 16,
the court based jurisdiction solely on transient presence, granting jurisdiction over the
employee served within the state but denying jurisdiction over the absent corporation.
The court believed that state sovereignty and the specific language of International Shoe
supported its decision (779 F.2d at 269; cf. supra note 12) and implied that only an
explicit contrary U.S. Supreme Court holding would cause the court to abandon its
reasoning. 779 F.2d at 268-70. Because Amusement Equipment not only upheld transient
jurisdiction and perpetrated stale notions of state sovereignty (see infra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text), but also applied a short-arm statute to cut off a valid cause of
action (see infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text), the decision represents exactly
the sort of reasoning that this Comment hopes to counter.
11 See supra note 16.
12 See, e.g., 95 U.S. at 722 ("[E]very state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."). See also 433 U.S. at 197
(quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722).
" 95 U.S. at 722. The constitutional justification for a foreign plaintiff being able
to bring a foreign suit to the forum would have been found in the privileges and
immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. If resident plaintiffs were allowed to
bring suit on the basis of physical control by the forum over the defendant and were
prevented from bringing suit by his absence, the nature of the litigation had little to do
with whether or not jurisdiction was obtainable. Under the vested rights choice of law
theory which prevailed at that time, and under the full faith and credit clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, the forum in which the defendant was physically present could be
required to adjudicate actions with which it had no relation other than its physical power
over the plaintiff and defendant. See also Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
14 Pennoyer makes no reference to a jurisdictional statute, but instead refers to
"well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent
State over persons and property." 95 U.S. at 722.
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state's power was its duty to provide the defendant with notice. 25
For one state to reach into a neighboring state, however, was
impermissible intrusion upon the power and sovereignty of a
sister state, whose authority over all persons and property within
its borders was considered absolute.
26
"Minimum contacts" jurisdiction proceeds on a completely
different basis. Jurisdictional authority is based upon the "con-
tacts, ties or relations ' 27 a defendant has established with the
adjudicating state. Such contacts may involve the defendant's
prior literal presence in a state, but such literal presence is not
required. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Calder v. Jones:
28
[A] valid basis for jurisdiction existed on the theory that pe-
titioners intended to, and did, cause tortious injury to respond-
ent in California. The fact that the actions causing the effects
in California were performed outside the State did not prevent
the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising out of those effects.
2 9
1 Courts originally presumed that notice must be physically delivered within the
state to validate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
659 (1950) (service within territorial boundary "indispensable") (Minton, J., dissenting);
95 U.S. at 722 (constructive service upon non-resident "ineffectual"). Courts later
recognized that notice could be constructively served upon a non-resident defendant.
See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (service of process delivered to state-
appointed agent within the state who mails notice to out-of-state defendant). Today
notice is constitutionally required to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the suit
rather than to physically acquire the jurisdiction via the serving of process. See, e.g.,
Wuchter v. Pizutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (state statutory scheme must ensure reasonable
notice of suit); Mullane v. Central Hannover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
("notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions"); National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (Wuchter requirements
can be waived or modified by private contract).
6 95 U.S. at 722 ("[No State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.").
326 U.S. at 319.
- 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
,1 Id. at 787. The defendants in this case were sued as natural persons rather than
in their capacities as employees of the newspaper corporation. Thus, the Court in Calder
specifically endorsed application of the "effects" test of the REsTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNFLcT oF LAWS § 37 (1971) to assertions of jurisdiction over private as well as
commercial actors. Id. at 787 n.6. This question had been left open in Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978). Under current "minimum contacts" analysis it
is not so much where the actor was or what type actor he was when he created contacts,
ties or relations to/with the forum, but that he is "a defendant who purposefully has
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Raw territorial power plays no part in present-day "minimum
contacts" analysis. Instead, the forum state determines if the
defendant's forum contacts make it "reasonably foreseeable"
that he be "haled into court" there.30 The jurisdiction where a
defendant currently resides has neither exclusive nor unlimited
power over his person. To reach therein to make him account-
able for injuries he has caused elsewhere is therefore no intru-
sion.3' Whereas jurisdiction under a territorial rationale was
almost always plenary, "minimum contacts" jurisdiction is al-
most always limited. The court asks whether a defendant's forum
"contacts, ties or relations '3 2 make it fair to institute this par-
ticular suit against him within this particular forum. The impor-
tance of this distinction is evidenced in the Court's discussion
of specific versus general jurisdiction.
Most of the recent Supreme Court decisions discuss specific
versus general jurisdiction. 33 Perhaps the clearest and most direct
directed his activities at forum residents." 471 U.S. at 477. The Burger King Court thus
reinterpreted the "purposeful availment" requirement of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958), putting emphasis on the purposeful part of the phrase and de-empha-
sizing whether the defendant gained any direct substantial benefit from his conduct. 471
U.S. at 474-76. This constitutes a potentially significant change from International Shoe's
original justification for jurisdiction, that of activities creating benefits and protection
which might also give rise to obligations. 326 U.S. at 319. The "benefit" part of the
International Shoe and Hanson analysis ultimately might be seen as an unnecessary
emphasis, in light of Burger King's new emphasis on purposeful direction, and given
the groundwork laid in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) and in
Calder. Benefit analysis might still be important, but only at a stage two level of
evaluating reasonableness to the defendant. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying
text. Only a few lower courts have picked up on this potentially significant shift from
purposeful benefit to purposeful direction. See, e.g., Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical
Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); Chung v. NANA Dev.
Corp., 783 F.2d 1124, 1130-31 (4th Cir. 1986) (Ervin, J., dissenting); Henry Heide, Inc.
v. WRH Prod. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1985); Masada Investment Corp. v.
Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332, 335-37 (Tenn. 1985).
The original language is from World-Wide Volkswagen: "[T]he foreseeability
that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find
its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection
to the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." 444 U.S. at 297. See also 471 U.S. at 474.
"1 Cf. Hazard, supra note 3, at 265 (exclusive jurisdiction invalid for multi-state
claims).
' 326 U.S. at 319.
471 U.S. at 472-73 nn.14 & 15; 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8 & 9; 465 U.S. at 779-80
n.ll; 465 U.S. at 787 n.6.
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discussion is in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall:3 4
When a controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defend-
ant's contacts with the forum [i.e., specific jurisdiction], the
Court has said that a "relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation" is the essential foundation of in
personam jurisdiction.
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or
relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State
[i.e., general jurisdiction] due process is not offended by a
State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdic-
tion when there are sufficient contacts between the State and
the foreign corporation.
3 5
Besides defining both types of jurisdiction, the Helicopteros
language reveals distinguishable tests for each type. For specific
jurisdiction, relations among defendant, forum, and litigation
determine whether jurisdiction is foreseeable.16 For general ju-
risdiction, a defendant's forum contacts can establish jurisdiction
without regard to the type litigation involved. Specific jurisdic-
tion is thus a very limited reaching out, pulling in and binding
the defendant only concerning the litigation's limited subject
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Id. at 414 (citations and footnotes omitted). In the two omitted footnotes, the
Court explicitly stated that the two types of jurisdiction discussed were specific and
general:
It has been said that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over
a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts
with the forum, the State is exercising "specific jurisdiction" over the
defendant....
When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum, the State has been said to be exercising "general jurisdiction" over
the defendant.
Id. nn.8 & 9 (citations omitted). For additional discussion of the difference between
specific and general jurisdiction, see Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 80-88; von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136-64.
Because the language of the specific jurisdiction test comes from Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 204 ("[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of
Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction."),
it is apparent in retrospect that Shaffer was a specific jurisdiction case. In fact, the
Supreme Court has had occasion to decide only two general jurisdiction cases, Helicop-
teros and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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matter.37 As Professors von Mehren and Trautman accurately
predicted some twenty years ago,3" specific jurisdiction has be-
come the increasingly preferred mode.3 9 General jurisdiction is
all that remains of the old plenary jurisdiction possible under
Pennoyer. Nevertheless, even today's general jurisdiction is
premised on the defendant's voluntary, systematic and continu-
ous contacts, rather than on the state's exclusive power over
objects within its boundaries. 40 For both general and specific
7 In contrast to the all or nothing plenary jurisdiction of Pennoyer, specific
jurisdiction binds the defendant for the very limited purpose of adjudicating claims
related to his specific jurisdictional contacts. It is at least theoretically possible for a
state to have specific jurisdiction over a defendant for some purposes and not for others.
Special or limited appearances therefore should not pose a problem under specific
jurisdiction analysis. For additional implications regarding choice of law and'joinder of
claims, see infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
" See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3. "[Tihe Perkins case should be
regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts, not as a significant reaffirmation of
obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction." Id. at 1144. "For reasons that have already
been suggested, ultimately only general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction should be
recognized, and the only relationship basing general jurisdiction should come to be
habitual residence except in those rare situations in which the defendant has no substan-
tial connection with any community." Id. at 1177 (emphasis in original).
31 For example, the Helicopteros Court was very careful to frame the question
before it as dealing only with general jurisdiction and left open the issue of whether
specific jurisdiction might have been possible upon the same facts. Compare the majority
opinion, 466 U.S. at 415 & n.10, 418 & n.12 with Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 421-
22 n.l, 425 & n.3. By so framing the issue, the Court was able to reach easily a decision
of no general jurisdiction that would have been more difficult had specific jurisdiction
tests been applied. See also Petroleum Helicopters Inc. v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367,
1370 (5th Cir. 1986). Cf. Patterson v. Dietz, 764 F.2d 1145, 1146 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1985)
(only specific jurisdiction asserted); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 392 n.6 (Cal. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (because
specific jurisdiction found, not necessary to determine if general jurisdiction exists).
" International Shoe left open the possibility of general jurisdiction by recognizing
that "there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U.S.
at 318 (emphasis added). In assessing whether any assertion of jurisdiction would be
fair, the International Shoe Court also recognized that: "Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure." Id. at 319 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The Perkins Court
recognized that it was permitting explicitly what only had been hinted at in International
Shoe-general jurisdiction on the basis of "minimum contacts." See 342 U.S. at 445-
46. After quoting the above International Shoe language, the Perkins Court determined
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jurisdiction then, the defendant's actions rather than territorial
power validate jurisdiction.
B. Two Stage Specific Jurisdiction Test of Threshold Contacts
Plus Relative Convenience
The above arguments require that personal jurisdiction al-
ways emphasize the defendant's actions. In Rush v. Savchuk,
4'
the majority stated that the proper test for specific jurisdiction
was the "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.' '42 Justice Brennan, in his dissent, offered instead a
that defendant's representative
carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the neces-
sarily limited wartime activities of the company. He there discharged his
duties as president and general manager .... [M]any of [the company's]
wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the
personal attention of its president in that state at the time he was served
with summons. Consideration of the circumstances which, under the law
of Ohio, ultimately will determine whether the courts of that State will
choose to take jurisdiction over the corporation is reserved for the courts
of that State. Without reaching that issue of state policy, we conclude that,
under the circumstances above recited, it would not violate federal due
process for Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation
in this proceeding.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added). Helicopteros identified the test for general jurisdiction as
whether defendant's contacts "constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general
business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins." 466 U.S. at 416 (emphasis
added). The test for general jurisdiction as developed by all three courts could be stated
as requiring systematic, continuous contacts of a certain quality that would not offend
due process.
4. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Rush involved an attempt by passenger Savchuk to assume
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over driver Rush in Minnesota for an accident that had taken
place in Indiana while the two were residents there. Because Indiana's guest statute
would have barred the claim by Savchuk under Indiana law, id. at 322, Rush desired to
have Minnesota's more favorable laws applied. By emphasizing that quasi-in-rem was
really just a form of specific jurisdiction-e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
(specific jurisdiction tests apply)-the Rush decision not only showed the sweep of
Shaffer, but also spelled the end of a line of cases that had validated jurisdiction by
attachment of a defendant's insurance policy. E.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,
579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); Seider v. Roth, 216
N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966). The Rush Court also declined to view Seider jurisdiction as
the equivalent of a direct action against the insurer, 444 U.S. at 330-31, and additionally
stressed that defendant contacts could not be aggregated among defendants, but must
be measured on an individual basis. Id. at 331-32.
41 444 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). The Rush language is, of course, almost a
direct quotation of the Shaffer formulation. See supra note 36.
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test based upon "minimum contacts [that] must exist 'among
the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum State.' -43
In its most recent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed the Rush
majority's emphasis on defendant contacts. 44 Significantly, for-
mer dissenter Justice Brennen authored the majority opinion in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 45  conceding that,
"[n]otwithstanding [other] considerations, the constitutional
touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully estab-
lished 'minimum contacts' in the forum State.
' 'M6
Numerous commentators have espoused personal jurisdiction
theories emphasizing relative fairness to and convenience of the
parties as the main criteria for valid in personam jurisdiction. 47
Although not endorsing Justice Brennan's particular calculus,
their arguments share the frustration of his earlier World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson4s and Rush v. Savchuk49 dissent:
In answering the question whether or not it is fair and
reasonable to allow a particular forum to hold a trial binding
on a particular defendant, the interests of the forum State and
4 444 U.S. at 309-10 (emphasis in original). Brennan was quoting from his Shaffer
dissent, 433 U.S. at 220, and the dispute between Brennan and the majorities in Rush
and World-Wide Volkswagen can be seen as the continuation of an earlier dispute that
traces back at least as far as Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235. See id. at 256-64 (Black,
J., dissenting, joined by Burton and Brennan). See also Leathers, Supreme Court Voting
Patterns Related to Jurisdictional Issues, to be published 62 WAsH. L. REv. (1987).
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 788 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984).
11 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
- Id. at 474 (emphasis added). See also id. at 481-82 ("[M]inimum-contacts
jurisdictional analysis ... focuses at the threshold solely on the defendant's purposeful
connection to the forum.") (emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 3; Lewis, supra note 18; Lilly, supra note 3;
McDougal, supra note 3; Redish, supra note 3; Weintraub, supra note 3.
-' 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
"1 444 U.S. 320. Justice Brennan applied the dissent to both cases, but also had a
larger purpose. After analyzing the facts of each case separately under his interpretation
of International Shoe's "minimum contacts" test, 444 U.S. at 302-07 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), Brennan further announced that: "It may be that affirmance of the judg-
ments in these cases would approach the outer limits of International Shoe's jurisdictional
principle. But that principle, with its almost exclusive focus on the rights of defendants,
may be outdated." Id. at 307-08. Thus the dissent was offered as groundwork for a
new theory of jurisdiction that would carry the "major advance" of International Shoe
a necessary step further. Id. at 308.
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other parties loom large in today's world and surely are entitled
to as much weight as are the interests of the defendant. The
"orderly administration of the laws" provides a firm basis for
according some protection to the interests of plaintiffs and
States as well as of defendants. 0
The trouble, however, with jurisdictional theories emphasizing
something other than defendant contacts is that convenience or
supposed state interest can improperly outweigh legitimate
defendant objections." Justice Brennan was able by the time of
Burger King to accomodate himself to a jurisdictional theory
emphasizing defendant contacts because false ideas about state
sovereignty had been laid to rest in the interim between World-
Wide Volkswagen and Burger King, 52 and because other factors
- Id. at 309 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan's use of the "orderly administra-
tion of the laws" language taken from the World-Wide Volkswagen opinion, id. at 294,
and orginally appearing in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, provides additional
insight into the eventual modification and clarification of the "minimum contacts" test
that would take place in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Brennan
saw the language as indicating that factors other than defendant contacts could enter
the jurisdictional calculus to determine the relative fairness of asserting jurisdiction, as
long as there were any defendant contacts. "Surely International Shoe contemplated
that the significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if
some other consideration helped establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasona-
ble." 444 U.S. at 300 (Brenan, J., dissenting). The World-Wide Volkswagen majority
saw the "orderly administration" phrase both as promoting interstate federalism and as
allowing the individual defendant to order his affairs in reliance upon state laws:
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State," it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to cus-
tomers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State... . The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
Id. at 297-98 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
The Burger King opinion accommodated both the World-Wide Volkswagen major-
ity's defendant expectation goals and Brennan's relative weighing goals by emphasizing
that the requirement of "purposeful availment" was to put a defendant on notice by
his actions that he might be subject to suit, 471 U.S. at 474-76, but that other factors
might play a dispositive role if defendant contacts had passed a certain threshold. Id.
at 476-78. This two stage contacts test is more fully explained at infra notes 76-85 and
accompanying text. See also supra note 29.
11 See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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were still allowed into the jurisdictional calculus at the second
stage of a two stage approach to personal jurisdiction decisions.
5 3
A jurisdiction theory emphasizing relative fairness could be-
come essentially a theory based on geographical convenience .
4
Geographical convenience, however, simply does not correlate
with the defendant's litigation related contacts and therefore
risks improper choice of law. For example, in a car accident
between an Evansville, Indiana native and a Shelbyville, Ken-
tucky native, occurring in Columbus, Ohio, there would be less
geographical inconvenience to the Evansville defendant if he
were sued in federal court in Louisville, Kentucky than if sued
in Columbus, Ohio. s Nevertheless, the Evansville defendant might
legitimately object to a Kentucky trial. Aside from the impor-
tance of jury pool selection that might give the Kentucky plain-
tiff a "home court" advantage,-6 the defendant also might fear
that choice of law rules could be applied against him.5 7 Although
See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
' The Court generally has equated inconvenience with geographical inconvenience.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) ("The purpose of this
test, of course, is to protect the defendant from the travail of defending in a distant
forum .. .") (emphasis added); 357 U.S. at 251 ("inconvenient or distant litigation").
-" Evansville is approxmately 100 miles west of Louisville; Columbus is approxi-
mately 200 miles northeast of Louisville; and Shelbyville is approximately 30 miles east
of Louisville.
' Jury pool sometimes can play a very significant role in plaintiff forum selection.
One need look no further than World-Wide Volkswagen, in which plaintiff's lawyer
very deliberately selected Oklahoma as forum, because "Creek County, Oklahoma ...
is one of the best jurisdictions in the United States in which to try a plaintiff's lawsuit."
Weintraub, supra note 3, at 500 n.98 (quoting from a personal letter from World-Wide
plaintiff's lawyer).
- If significant differences between Ohio and Kentucky law existed, the Indiana
defendant might expect Ohio law to be applied; because Ohio was the focus of the
accident that formed the subject matter of the litigation. Besides obviously substantive
issues such as comparative negligence, applicability of a seat belt defense, and absence
or presence of a guest statute, statutes of limitation could also vary significantly between
states. Supreme Court cases again provide examples of plaintiff forum shopping which
definitely involved a hunt for favorable substantive law. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 41
(plaintiff desired non-application of an Indiana guest statute); Keeton 465 U.S. at 773
(the choice of New Hampshire as forum clearly was motivated by that state's "unusually
long (6-year) limitation period for libel actions. New Hampshire was the only State
where petitioner's suit would not have been time-barred when it was filed.").
If a major difference between the contacts analysis that governs personal jurisdiction
and the contacts analysis that governs choice of law exists, it is that while sovereignty
concerns play no role in specific jurisdiction beyond providing law which acts as a
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the defendant could personally appeal any adverse choice of law
ruling, there would be no guarantee of winning on appeal. By
keeping the litigation out of Kentucky entirely, the defendant
would obviate any adverse choice of law concerns.5 8
The problem becomes even more pronounced if the defen-
dant stays out of the Kentucky litigation, believing he can inval-
idate the judgment when it is sought to be enforced against him
in Indiana. Although a sister state is permitted to refuse full
faith and credit to a judgment for which the rendering court
lacked personal jurisdiction, choice of law decisions in the orig-
inal default judgment cannot be challenged collaterally.5 9 If con-
venience became the sole test for personal jurisdiction, a
defendant might be forced to accept default judgments from
jurisdictional statute (see infra notes 61-68, 91-96, 118-19 and accompanying text),
sovereignty concerns may play some role in determining which of several states has a
more valid interest in having its law applied to a controversy.
As personal jurisdiction theory had to recognize that more than one state can have
possible jurisdiction over a claim, so the old-fashioned choice of law search for one
state that had exclusive right to apply its laws to a controversy has rightly given way to
a recognition that any of several states' laws can validly be applied to some controversies.
See Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-13, 308 n.1l, 311 nn.15-17 (1981), and cases
cited therein. Cf. 471 U.S. at 483 n.26. Because these choice of law sovereignty concerns
only directly come into play once jurisdiction over the parties has been obtained, the
foreign state interested in having its law applied to the controversy has no direct way of
participating in the choice of law decision process. The forum state, under principles of
comity, might be willing to apply foreign law to the case before it, but can be compelled
to do so only should the parties before it so demand. That choice of law sovereignty
concerns must thus be mediated through individuals and foreign courts would seem to
strengthen the argument that choice of law constitutional protections are designed
primarily to protect individuals' rights.
5s This is akin to the indirect double counting of choice of law concerns condemned
by Professor Lewis. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 3, at 814-35. As the argument of the
next paragraph of text makes clear, however, double counting may be necessary in
default judgment situations under current collateral attack rules. The issue thus is not
solely whether the Court will eventually put more teeth into its choice of law constitu-
tional analysis (See, e.g., Drobak, supra note 3, at 1056 n.157), but whether legitimate
choice of law concerns can be protected other than via a "minimum contacts" test for
personal jurisdiction.
59 See, e.g., 472 U.S. 797, 805 ("[A] judgment issued without proper personal
jurisdiction over an absent party is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere and
thus has no res judicata effect as to that party."); Martin, Constitutional Limitations
on Choice of Law, 61 ColNEuL L. Ray. 185, 230 & n.147 (1976) ("When a claim has
been reduced to judgment, the enforcing state is allowed to inquire only as to the
jurisdiction of the rendering court over the parties.").
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states that had no meaningful connection to the litigation. 6° By
keeping the specific jurisdiction focus on contacts between
defendant, forum, and litigation, the Shaffer test protects the
defendant's legitimate expectations regarding which forums will
be allowed to apply their laws against him.
The choice of law rights indirectly protected are those of the
defendant to have the proper law applied to his case. The state
whose law eventually is applied has no independent right to
insist that its laws be applied outside its own jurisdiction. 61 Thus,
the unequivocal phrasing of World-Wide Volkswagen was right
in result but wrong in logic.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconve-
nience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of
another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is
the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.
6 2
A state may be prevented from exercising jurisdiction on any
basis other than defendant contacts not because of interstate
federalism interests, but instead because of the defendant's per-
- Carried to its absurd extreme, a defendant could be subjected to suit in a forum
with which he had no litigation related contacts and no expectation of suit. Thus,
changing the facts of the IN/KY/OH hypothetical, assume that the KY plaintiff brings
suit in St. Louis, MO or Carbondale, IL, both of which are considerably closer to
defendant's residence than Columbus, OH, but neither of which is related to the litigation
involving this plaintiff and this defendant. Assume further that defendant sometimes
makes trips to visit relatives in St. Louis or to visit children attending college at
Carbondale. Thus, defendant's brief trips to these non-litigation related jurisdictions
arguably illustrate that it is not insurmountably inconvenient for him to travel there to
defend against suit. Some commentators might even say, confusing general with specific
jurisdiction, or confusing stage two with stage one analysis (see infra notes 69-86 and
accompanying text), that these contacts are "countable" in the International Shoe sense.
Nevertheless, would a lawyer advising a client that he could safely stay out of such
litigation reasonably expect that jurisdiction could be obtained on such facts? And if
default judgments could be so obtained, would not a plaintiff's harassment power be
dramatically increased? Contra McDougal, supra note 3, at 41-43 (original filing in a
"disinterested" forum should be encouraged); Cf. Lewis, supra note 18, at 29-31 (non-
litigation contacts should be counted to determine jurisdiction).
See supra note 57.
444 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added).
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sonal liberty interests.63 This was eventually made clear in In-
surance Corporation of Ireland v. Compaigne des Bauxites de
Guinee.4
Writing for the majority in Ireland, Justice White, who in
World-Wide Volkswagen had insisted that sister state sovereignty
demanded a "minimum contacts" approach, now admitted that
the defendant's due process rights really demanded this ap-
proach:
[O]ur holding today does not alter the requirement that there
be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defendant
and the forum State.... The restriction on state sovereign
power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however,
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is
the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and
the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.
Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an inde-
pendent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it
would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of
sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to
powers from which he may otherwise be protected.65
This emphasis on "individual liberty" protection received ex-
plicit endorsement in the recent Burger King and Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts66 decisions. 67 The "minimum contacts"
requirement is a first level protection so that a defendant cannot
"Personal liberty interests" is an adaptation of language from Insurance Corp.
of Ireland. See infra text accompanying note 65. Before Ireland, there was considerable
debate about whether state sovereignty should or should not play any direct independent
role in personal jurisdiction decisions. The history and flavor of the debate is well
captured by Drobak, supra note 3, at 1042-48 & nn.125-26. Professor Lewis, probably
the strongest opponent of sovereignty playing any role in jurisdictional analysis, has
forcefully made his case in three recent lengthy articles. See Lewis, supra note 3; Lewis,
supra note 18; and Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NoTmE DA~m L. RE,. 699
(1983). See also Redish, supra note 3.
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
Id. at 702 n.10 (emphasis added).
- 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
67 Id. at 807; 471 U.S. at 471-72 & n.13.
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be dragged into an unfair forum, regardless of how hypotheti-
cally convenient.
6
8
The most recent Supreme Court specific jurisdiction deci-
sions, however, continue to mention factors other than defen-
dant contacts as relevant to the personal jurisdictional inquiry.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine69 asserts that New Hampshire has a
jurisdictional interest in protecting its citizens from libelous read-
ing matter.70 Keeton also explains that plaintiff residence can
sometimes "play an important role in determining the propriety
of entertaining a suit against defendant in the forum. ' 71 This
role was decisive in Calder v. Jones,72 which held that when the
plaintiff was "the focus of the activities of the defendants out
of which the suit [arose]" the contacts were "so manifold as to
permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence.
'73
In Burger King, Justice Brennan listed several non-contact fac-
tors that "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of
jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required. ' 74 In a portion of the Asahi Metal
opinion which received eight Justices' votes, Justice O'Connor
explained that "[a] court must consider the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining relief ... [plus] 'the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantial social policies.' "7 How can the em-
phases in these cases upon factors other than defendant contacts
be reconciled with defendant minimum contacts as the basis for
in personam jurisdiction? Are defendant contacts an absolute
minimum designed to protect the defendant against unforeseea-
11 For discussion whether the defendant's waiver of this protection can compel a
forum to hear plaintiff's suit, see infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Id. at 776.
Id. at 780.
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
7, Id. at 788.
14 471 U.S. at 477. The non-contact factors are borrowed by Brennan from the
list compiled in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Cf. 471 U.S. at 473-74
(rationale for why factors in addition to defendant contacts might have relevance).
71 Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987) (quoting 444 U.S. at 292).
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ble suit, or is there some sliding scale which measures defendant
contacts against "other factors"?
The confusion is lessened by realizing that the Supreme Court
implicitly, and explicitly in Burger King, conducts "minimum
contacts" analysis in two different steps or stages: "Once it has
been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum
contacts within the forum State, [then] these contacts may be
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play
and substantial justice.' ,,76 At the first stage, "minimum con-
tacts" are an absolute threshold beyond which the defendant
must pass before any non-consensual" assertion of specific ju-
risdiction can fulfill due process.7 8 At this first stage, the Court
is seeking only to establish that forum contacts were purposeful,
gave rise to or were related to the cause of action, and reasonably
put the defendant on notice that he could be sued there.7 9 The
second stage test is more restrictive, focusing on the defendant's
practical ability to conduct suit in the forum. As the Burger
King Court states:
[Mlinimurn requirements inherent in the concept of "fair play
and substantial justice" may defeat the reasonableness of ju-
risdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in
forum activities. As we previously have noted, jurisdictional
rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litigation
76 471 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added and word inserted).
" The consent referred to here has no relation to the fictive consent implied in
jurisdictional consent statutes, but is rather the positive waiving of jurisdictional objec-
tions by defendant referred to in Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10 (see also supra text at
note 65), or the truly negotiated stipulations approved in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472
n.14.
"$ The majority of Justices in the Asahi Metal decision continue to apply a two
stage test as described in this Comment. Part IIA of Justice O'Connor's opinion
concludes that the stage one threshold was never passed, but Part IIB shows that even
had the stage one hurdle been cleared, stage two fairness concerns would be violated.
See 107 S. Ct. at 1031-35. It is on this basis that Justice Brennan is able to concur.
"This is one of those rare cases in which 'minimum requirements inherent in the concept
of "fair play and substantial justice" . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even
[though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities,' " writes Brennan,
quoting from his Burger King opinion which made the two stage test explicit. Id. at
1035 (Brennan, J., concurring).
' See 471 U.S. at 472-76.
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"so gravely difficult and inconvenient" that a party unfairly
is at a "severe disadvantage" in comparison to his opponentso
Once convenience is made comparative, plaintiff convenience
becomes a standard against which defendant inconvenience can
be measured.s' These comparative convenience questions only
1 Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added, citations omitted). It is important to note that
the Burger King burdens of proof are different, depending upon whether the "minimum
contacts" analysis is proceeding at stage one or at stage two. At stage one the burden
is upon the plaintiff to show that defendant has purposefully established litigation related
contacts that put defendant on notice regarding the foreseeability of suit. But at stage
two the burden shifts to the defendant: "[W]here a defendant who purposefully has
directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable. Most such considerations usually may be accommodated through means
short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional." Id. at 477. Stage two analysis is thus
restrictive in the sense that otherwise valid stage one jurisdiction can be defeated at stage
two if proven unconstitutionally inconvenient to the defendant. But once the stage one
purposeful directedness threshold has been passed, non-litigation related factors can
enter into the calculus against the defendant, and the defendant bears the burden of
showing why it is constitutionally unreasonable for him to defend himself where his
litigation related contacts occurred.
This shift in burden of proof continues to be recognized in Asahi. In the part of
the opinion joined in by all Justices, Justice O'Connor wrote: "When minimum contacts
have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise
of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant." 107
S. Ct. at 1034. At least one lower court has also recognized this shift in burden of
proof, Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1400
(9th Cir. 1986); while the two stage nature of the minimum contacts test has been
recognized by most courts. E.g., Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124, 1129-30,
1132 (4th Cir. 1986); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1985).
Whether the Burger King dual stage analysis would cause reversal of prior Supreme
Court jurisdictional results is unclear. Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen both rested
on the assertion that no purposeful contacts, ties, or relations existed between defendant
and forum in either case. It is possible to argue, however, at least in World-Wide
Volkswagen, that the Court would have been able to invalidate jurisdiction on stage two
convenience grounds, even if stage one litigation related contacts were admitted. The
fact that five Justices invalidated jurisdiction in Asahi on this basis indicates it could be
a retrospective way to read World-Wide Volkswagen.
:I McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) provides the clearest
example of relative plaintiff convenience outweighing defendant inconvenience. Once the
McGee defendant had passed the stage one contacts threshold by directing premium
collection at the California plaintiff, the convenience of the plaintiff became paramount.
These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to
follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally
accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants
frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign
forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof .... Of course
1987]
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become relevant, however, once the first stage "minimum con-
tacts" hurdle is cleared. If contacts are insufficient at the first
stage, inquiries about plaintiff and defendant convenience simply
are irrelevant, and no amount of plaintiff need for a convenient
forum can validate an assertion of specific jurisdiction.82 Defend-
ant inconvenience, however, can make unconstitutional an as-
sertion of jurisdiction that would otherwise be valid at stage
one.83 Because the same defendant contacts often determine con-
stitutionality at each stage,84 the World-Wide Volkswagen "min-
imum contacts" rationale should be rephrased as follows:
there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in
California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts
to a denial of due process.
Id. at 223-24. See also Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).
12 The Court has left open the possibility of a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity
that would recognize the need for a forum. See 466 U.S. at 419 n.13; 433 US. at 211
n.37. Such a doctrine is probably not needed. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), sometimes cited as an example of jurisdiction by necessity,
can be explained in specific jurisdiction terms. See Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 108; von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1159-60. Accord: U.S. Trust Co. v. Bohart, 495
A.2d 1034, 1038-39 (Conn. 1985). If the defendant's contacts do not cross the stage one
threshold, the plaintiff arguably does not have a valid cause of action upon which to
sue. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text. This would be true either because
the actions occurred where they were not blameworthy (i.e., not tortious or contract
breaking or illegal under local law) or because the actions were so diffused that they
were within the reach of no particular location's laws. If a doctrine of jurisdiction by
necessity eventually is recognized, it should be reserved for those rare situations in which
aggregation of contacts across several forums is the only way possible to accumulate
one jurisdictionally recognizable claim, and/or for those situations in which, although
it usually would be unreasonable for defendant to defend, no alternative plaintiff forum
exists. Such exceptions clearly would favor a plaintiff's right to sue over a defendant's
right not to be sued. In another context, the Court has stated explicitly that "the
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is
not a reason to find standing." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (quoting Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
S3 But cf. supra notes 80 and 81 (explaining how burden of proof shifts at stage
two).
. Because the Court prior to Burger King had not recognized explicitly any two
stage "minimum contacts" analysis, it is difficult to determine whether its prior findings
of no jurisdiction were based on failure to satisfy stage one or stage two tests. Cf.
Drobak, supra note 3, at 1042 & n.118 (whether "minimum contacts" is the complete
test or only part of a jurisdictional test). When the defendant's only contacts with the
forum are his litigation related contacts, the same "minimum contacts" are evaluated
by both tests. In situations, however, where the defendant has either pre or post litigation
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The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to
perform two related, but distinguishable functions. It protects
the defendant against the burden of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum [i.e., stage two analysis]. And it acts to
ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by the due process clause
to haul defendants into the forum for suits unrelated to their
contacts there [i.e., stage one analysis]. s5
Exploration of the factors of stage two "minimum contacts"
analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. Furthermore,
although major battles inevitably will be fought at that level,
stage two fairness and convenience is based necessarily on the
facts of the particular case.86 The remainder of this Comment
focuses therefore on stage one "minimum contacts" analysis or,
more accurately, on the legal authority by which states attempt
to "hale defendants into their courts." 87 In other words, if state
sovereignty plays no role in protecting resident defendants from
litigation in other states where they have contacts, 88 what role
does state sovereignty play in providing forums where plaintiffs
can adjudicate claims?
contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the litigation, these could be evaluated to
determine whether the defendant reasonably could defend in the forum. Such evaluation,
however, would take place only at stage two. A dearth of other contacts with the forum
should make it more difficult to meet the stage two reasonableness requirements (e.g.,
Kulko and World Wide Volkswagen); abundance of contacts might make the decision
to grant jurisdiction more likely (e.g., Allstate v. Hague re: jurisdiction, not choice of
law). See also Asahi Metal, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96 (pre-litigation contacts relevant);
Lewis, supra note 18, at 29-31 (post-litigation contacts relevant).
,1 444 U.S. at 291-92 (original text replaced by emphasized words). The original
language was "their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." Id.
" Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness,"
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to
determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are pres-
ent .... We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers
will be written "in black and white. The greys are dominant and even
among them the shades are innumerable."
436 U.S. at 92 (citations omitted) (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246; and Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
1,7 See 472 U.S. at 807; 471 U.S. at 475; 444 U.S. at 297.
" See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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II. DISPELLING MYTHS CONCERNING LONG-ARM STATUTES
A. Why a Long-Arm Statute is Not Needed for Assertions of
Specific Jurisdiction
Most modern courts begin specific jurisdiction analysis by
consulting the state special jurisdictional statute, or "long-arm"
statute, to see what contacts will trigger forum jurisdiction.8 9
Although Supreme Court decisions seem to encourage this prac-
tice by citing the relevant state long-arm statutes before pro-
ceeding further,90 this Comment argues that a long-arm statute
is not constitutionally mandated and that the search for an
applicable long-arm statute obscures inquiry into the real bases
for jurisdiction.
For specific jurisdiction, a state expresses its willingness to
bring a hypothetical defendant under its control by defining
objectionable conduct. This is equivalent to a stage one defini-
tion of the relationship among forum and litigation9' before any
specific defendant or defendant contacts are thrown into the
9 E.g., Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392,
1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ("plaintiff must show, first, that the state statute of the forum
confers personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant . . ."); Wallace v. Herron,
778 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We look first to Indiana's 'long-arm' statute...."),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1642 (1986); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir.
1985) ("The first step of the [personal jurisdiction] inquiry is solely a matter of deter-
mining the reach of the forum state's long-arm statute."); Afram Export Corp. v.
Metallurgiki Hayps, 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The first question we take
up is whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute ... can be used ... to haul Metallurgiki
before a federal court in Wisconsin."); Bond Leather Co. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg., 764 F.2d
928, 931 (1st Cir. 1985) ("T]wo questions must be answered affirmatively in order for
a Massachusetts court properly to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant: '1) is the assertion of jurisdiction authorized by the [Massachusetts long-arm]
statute, and 2) if authorized, is the exercise of jurisdiction under State law consistent
with basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Constitution?' "
(quoting Good Hope Indus. v. Ryder Scott Co., 389 N.E.2d 76, 79 (Mass. 1979)
(emphasis and second set brackets in original)).
0 Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
786 n.5 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 & n.4 (1984).
Although citing the relevant state statutes, no Court opinion states that the long-arm
statutes are required for assertions of jurisdiction.
91 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of stage one
versus stage two analysis.
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calculus.92 This definition takes place via the state substantive
law, not via the long-arm statute, and is the only expression of
state interest concerning the litigation which should be permit-
ted. 93 In other words, the rule defining the cause of action acts
In assessing "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion," Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), the relationship between the forum
and the litigation has been expressed by the forum state's substantive law. The defend-
ant's "minimum contacts" activate this law and lead to litigation. See infra text accom-
panying notes 93-95.
" The Court has spoken of a special state interest in regulating certain activities
as a factor to consider in granting or denying jurisdiction. E.g., 465 U.S. at 776-77
(special desire to obtain jurisdiction over torts occurring within state); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 252-53 (1958) (approval of cases granting jurisdiction when state had
enacted "special legislation ... [to provide] effective redress for citizens who had been
injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State treats as exceptional and
subjects to special regulation"); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (state has
special interest in regulating conduct on its highways). It is hard to see under close
analysis, however, what is exceptional about the activities thus regulated. All that really
is taking place is that state substantive law is being applied to the defendant's contacts
with the state. State substantive remedial and regulatory law is always in a sense
exceptional, because it expresses the state's willingness to hold defendants accountable
for actions that, without the law, would not be blameworthy. A state, in enacting
regulatory law, or a court, in creating remedies, always looks to the state policy or
special interest in providing relief to victims or inflicting punishment on wrongdoers. In
Hess and Keeton it is hard to see that either Massachusetts or New Hampshire had any
special jurisdictional goals in mind when they recognized torts involving automobile
accidents occurring on their roads, or when they enacted libel statutes, respectively.
Although Justice Rehnquist makes much of the fact that New Hampshire's criminal
defamation statute is not restricted to defamation of New Hampshire residents, 465 U.S.
at 777, it would be an odd state policy that would allow nonresidents to be negligently
crashed into on state highways or libelled in in-state publications with impunity, and
such a discriminatory policy probably would be suspect under the equal protection or
privileges and immunities clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
By emphasizing the special need for a state to regulate such activities, courts actually
rationalize why a state has power to bring nonphysically present or nonresident defend-
ants under its judicial control. Commentators correctly have pointed out that emphasis
on special state interests is a form of impermissible double counting. E.g., Drobak,
supra note 3, at 1016, 1051, 1056 n.157; Lewis, supra note 3, at 771, 812-22. If litigation
related defendant contacts already have been counted at stage one of the jurisdictional
analysis, there should be no need to count again the state's regulatory interest at stage
two.
What usually has been missed is that the forum state's interest definitely should be
counted at stage one. Because jurisdictional thinking is still unduly influenced by notions
of power, presence, and territoriality, the usual focus at stage one has been only upon
whether the defendant had contacts. It is easy to slip into thinking of contacts as a form
of substitute presence, but this is not the rationale behind International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe specifically rejected any test which
saw contacts in terms of "a little more or a little less" and instead focused upon "the
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also as the state's jurisdictional statute for that action. 94 The
constitutional specific jurisdiction requirement of minimum liti-
gation-related defendant contacts 95 prevents a state from using
its substantive law to take jurisdiction of unrelated litigation.
96
quality and nature" of defendant's activities. Id. at 319. The contacts that are jurisdic-
tionally significant are the contacts that are culpable according to the state substantive
law. Focus upon the state's jurisdictional statute deflects attention from where the state
interest truly is reflected-in its substantive law. Jurisdictional statutes can express only
indirectly the state's tort or regulatory policies, because they necessarily must defer to
the state substantive law for ultimate definitions of what activities will be jurisdictionally
counted. This Comment therefore argues that state jurisdictional statutes should be
ignored when determining the forum state's jurisdictional interest and jurisdictional
reach. Instead, courts should recognize that state substantive law also acts as the state's
jurisdictional statutes. Cf. Kalo, supra note 10, at 1194-95 (jurisdiction should be granted
when state law is to be applied). See also infra note 196 (same constitutional principles
for choice of law as for personal jurisdiction).
94 Although this argument is mainly an example of the classic hypothesis-i.e.,
assume that it is true and see if it does not explain the facts better than existing
theories-some support can be extracted from diverse sources. Consider: (1) that no
jurisdictional statute was ever needed for common law recognized bases of jurisdiction
such as presence, consent, and appearance; see R. ,VEINTRAUB, CoMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 129-30 (2d ed. 1980); (2) that commentators have questioned whether
judicial interpretations of state jurisdictional policy or defendant expectations regarding
application of state law might not serve as effectively to bring defendants under state
jurisdiction as a legislatively enacted statute; see E. Scois & P. HAY, CONFCT OF
LAws 313 (1982) (statute not required for expression of state jurisdictional policy);
Lewis, supra note 3, at 842-43 (judicial interpretation effective); Silberman, supra note
3, at 66-67 (defendant expectations effective); and (3) that state jurisdictional policy
sometimes seems in conflict with itself.
In this last regard, states with restrictive long-arm statutes continue to recognize
some forms of jurisdiction that are not authorized by these supposedly all-inclusive long-
arm statutes. This phenomenon has been identified in our own state by Leathers,
Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755 (1983-84). After
showing that implied jurisdiction over nonresidents is authorized by other state law
outside of Kentucky's long-arm statute for divorce, eminent domain, probate, and trust
situations, id. at 765-71, Professor Leathers explains that "in choosing between the
legislative directive to exercise jurisdiction in such cases ... and the legislative restraint
on jurisdiction [attached to the long-arm statute], the Court should find the directive to
exercise jurisdiction is controlling." Id. at 776. See also id. at 776-77 (perhaps uncon-
stitutional to restrict judiciary in applying other elements of state law). This Comment
carries such analysis a significant step further. If legislatures and judges have been
explicit about what activity the state desires to control (i.e., the explicitness of state
substantive law), then there is always implied jurisdiction in such statements of substan-
tive law, and this implied jurisdiction should be subject only to constitutional restraints,
not to any filtering through a long-arm statute.
9 I.e., the International Shoe "minimum contacts" test at stage one. See supra
notes 27-46, 76-85 and accompanying text.
" The federal constitutional protections afforded defendants under the due process
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Commentators and jurists who mistakenly believe a special
long-arm statute is needed to assert jurisdiction 97 are still under
the sway of the territorial power mentality of Pennoyer v. Neff.9
Just as pre-International Shoe Co. v. Washington99 consent and
"doing business" statutes fictively brought the defendant within
the state's territory to legitimize jurisdiction, °0 today's specific
jurisdiction long-arm statutes purport to define the state's juris-
diction over those who are not its citizens or within its borders.
Such statutes, however, are not mandated constitutionally. 01
Instead, the state shows its desire to hear a particular claim by
providing substantive law under which suit can be brought.0 2
By that law, the parties who then initiate forum contacts through
their conduct are on notice that the state can exercise specific
jurisdiction. 0 3 Thus, a specific jurisdiction statute's only rele-
vance is to provide notice that suit has been filed,10 because the
clause effectively prevent a state from applying its laws to controversies with which it
has no real connection. If the state cannot obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, the
state will be unable to guarantee application of its law to his conduct. See supra notes
54-68, 85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89.
* 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The fictiveness of the attempt first was exposed by Judge Learned Hand in
Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). The fictive attempt was
abandoned by the Supreme Court in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17, and was
placed in historical perspective in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 201-03.
"" See infra note 146.
IY. Of course the state also must provide courts having subject matter jurisdiction.
How and to what extent it is possible for a court created under the constitution and
laws of one state to have subject matter jurisdiction to apply the laws of another state
is an intriguing choice of law proposition beyond the scope of this Comment but touched
on to some extent infra at notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
-" How related the contacts must be io the claim is an issue still to be decided by
the court. That there may be an important distinction between claims which "arise out
of" versus claims that "relate to" a defendant's contacts with a state is hinted at in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10, 419-20 (1984)
(majority leaves issue open; Brennan believes it makes no difference). See also supra
note 82.
V4 When litigation arising from the contacts is certain or nearly certain to follow,
and when the defendant's own actions make it impossible or unlikely for him to receive
actual notice, it might even be possible for the original defendant contacts alone to put
the defendant on notice regarding litigation. See, e.g., Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1968) (automobile accident defendants failed to give adequate address for
police report-jurisdiction upheld).
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authority to hale the defendant into court is provided not by the
long-arm statute, but by the forum substantive law under which
plaintiff sues. In International Shoe, Washington's substantive
taxing statute both provided a mechanism for service of process
and defined what activities were to be taxed. 05 In most situations
the particular substantive law provides no notice provisions; state
procedural rules, including the long-arm statute, must be con-
sulted to find what notice steps should be taken.06 The long-
arm statute as a measure of jurisdictional reach, however, is
irrelevant.
This analysis explains two types of inconsistencies in earlier
decisions. The first inconsistency is illustrated by cases such as
Jim Fox Enterprises v. Air France,0 7 in which a long-arm statute
that on its face did not reach the defendant was nevertheless
interpreted expansively to give the state jurisdiction. 03 The de-
cision was correct if the Texas legislature, in passing the statute,
believed it needed to statutorily provide its citizens with a way
of reaching absent defendants. The words of the statute were
not as important as the fact that the statute was designed to
reach out. As Justice Brennan in dissent wrote in Shaffer v.
Heitner:
326 U.S. at 311-12.
'0 For cases exploring constitutional constraints on notice provisions, see supra
note 25.
Im 705 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
101 The Fox case illustrates unambiguously that the long-arm statute, objectively
construed, did not reach. When the case was first appealed, the district court and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the Texas long-arm statute as not reaching
"nearly as far as Due Process would permit," because the statute required the claim to
arise out of defendant's business in the state. Jim Fox Enterprises v. Air France, 664
F.2d 63, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1981); rev'd on rehearing, 705 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). See
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b § 3 (Vernon 1964) (repealed, 1985), quoted in
466 U.S. 408, 413 n.7. Only after the Texas Supreme Court reconstrued the specific
jurisdiction statute, in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870
(Tex. 1982), as effectively reaching to the constitutional limits of due process, did the
Fifth Circuit grant rehearing in Fox and defer to the Texas court's interpretation. The
U.S. Supreme Court also seemed skeptical of the state supreme court's interpretation.
See 466 U.S. at 412-13 & n.7. See also infra notes 143, 145-46 and accompanying text.
The Fox and Hall cases are not just a Texas phenomenon. Professor Lewis docu-
ments examples of similarly construed statutes from Illinois, Georgia, South Carolina,
Puerto Rico, and Oklahoma. Lewis, supra note 3, at 843-46 & nn.406-08. Oklahoma's
statute was applied in World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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I certainly would not want to rule out the possibility that
Delaware's courts might decide that the legislature's overriding
purpose of securing the personal appearance in state courts of
defendants would best be served by reinterpreting its statute
to permit state jurisdiction on the basis of constitutionally
permissible contacts rather than stock ownership. 0 9
States therefore are permitted, even encouraged, to strain the
facial meaning of their jurisdictional statutes so that the statutes
reach to the constitutional limits of state authority.110
All this twisting of meanings is reminiscent of the way au-
tomobile and corporate consent statutes were twisted prior to
International Shoe to find consent where none existed."' Just as
the reality of jurisdiction in those pre-International Shoe days
did not depend on fictive consent but rather on purposeful
"minimum contacts,""12 so the reality of jurisdiction under a
long-arm statute does not rest on any enabling power of the
long-arm statute itself but rather upon a court's case by case
determination that the defendant's contacts and the forum's
interest in hearing the case coincide. Thus, a long-arm statute
can be twisted or used as a pretext because it is irrelevant to the
true bases of jurisdiction.
The second type of inconsistency is shown in cases such as
Kulko v. California Superior Court"' and Shaffer. In Kulko,
California's jurisdictional statute reached to the constitutional
maximum," 4 yet the Court still desired, and did not find, a
433 U.S. 186, 221 (1980) (emphasis added).
Some states' statutes are mere expressions that the state will reach to the
constitutional maximum. E.g., CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); N.J. Cwv.
PRAc. R. 4:4-4 (repealed); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (1970). When a state enacts such a
statute, the "content" of the statute gives the judge applying it no direct guidance
regarding the types of contacts relevant for jurisdictional purposes. Instead, the judge
must look directly to state substantive law to define defendant contacts as either litigation
or nonlitigation related. This Comment argues that the judge should do this regardless
of the nature of the jurisdictional statute. "Constitutional maximum" statutes are hollow
shells or mere forms that reveal the true nature of all jurisdictional statutes.
See supra notes 25 and 100.
"2 See supra notes 2, 29, and 100.
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
Id. at 89 ("California Code ... demonstrated an intent that the courts of
California utilize all bases of in personam jurisdiction 'not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution.' ").
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special jurisdictional statute that covered the activity involved in
the case." 5 Similarly, in Shaffer, after assuming arguendo in a
footnote that notice provisions of Delaware's sequestration stat-
ute would inform defendants of suit in the forum,16 the majority
failed to find the necessary minimum contacts. The Court based
its decision largely on Delaware's failure to enact a special
jurisdictional statute making acceptance of a directorship tan-
tamount to a waiver of jurisdictional objections when suits arise
from director activities. 1' 7 The cases thus say on one hand that
a generalized jurisdictional statute is either not relevant (Kulko)
or not needed (Shaffer), and yet on the other hand that a specific
jurisdictional statute very definitely is needed.
The inconsistency is resolved by accepting the theory that
jurisdictional statutes per se are never needed. Thus the Supreme
Court was right to ignore California's existing long-arm statute
in Kulko and to proceed without a long-arm statute in Shaffer.
But the Court added unnecessary confusion by then seeking a
special jurisdictional statute in both cases. If denial of jurisdic-
tion due to lack of forum interest in Kulko and in Shaffer was
proper, the evidence of that lack of forum interest was to be
found in each state's total substantive law, not just in statutes
labelled jurisdictional. Perhaps this is what the Court meant by
noting that California had enacted no special child support
legislation but was instead a participant within the Revised Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA).Y5
Similarly, perhaps Delaware did not have any substantive policy
"I Id. at 98 ("California has not attempted to assert any particularized interest in
trying such cases in its courts by, e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute.").
116 433 U.S. 186, 213, n.40 ("[W]e will assume that the procedures followed would
be sufficient to bring appellants before the Delaware courts, if minimum contacts
existed."). See also id. at 220-22 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting that this issue should
not have been reached by the majority).
117 Id. at 214, 216.
"I The jurisdictional dispute in Kulko, 436 U.S. 84, was very narrow. Kulko did
not contest the jurisdiction of the California courts for custody purposes, but only for
purposes of increasing child support obligations which had earlier been calculated in a
separation agreement negotiated and signed in New York. Id. at 87-88. Thus, the Court's
emphasis on California's participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act of 1968 (RURESA), id. at 98-100, may have been unconscious affir-
mation that this was the controlling California legislation, thus, according to the argu-
ment of this Comment, also the appropriate jurisdictional statute. See id. at 99.
[VOL. 75
19871 PERSONAL JURISDICTION
that held corporate directors accountable for all activity related
to their corporate decisions, and the lack of a consent statute
was evidence of this.119 In any case, to determine a forum's
willingness or right to assume jurisdiction on the basis of the
long-arm statute is misguided, because the pure long-arm statute
is in reality a fiction, 12° is redundant,' 2' or is irrelevant. 22 The
long-arm statute therefore should be ignored when determining
a state's jurisdictional reach.
There are, however, situations in which some might argue
that a long-arm statute or its equivalent theoretically could be
relevant. First, because the self-implementation of "minimum
contacts" via a state's substantive law can apply only to exercises
of specific jurisdiction, 123 the question remains whether general
", Alternatively, Delaware's failure to enact a consent statute arguably could be a
factor taken into account at stage two of the "minimum contacts" analysis. See supra
notes 80-84 and accompanying text. If corporate directors had relied upon Delaware's
legislative silence as an indication that they could not be sued there for their corporate
activities, then this reliance might have structured their conduct so that it would be
unreasonable to later ask them to defend in Delaware, even if they had contacts
litigationally related to the state. See 433 U.S. at 216.
Neither of these arguments is compelling. Heitner was suing on a shareholder's
derivative suit, a form of action valid under Delaware law. Cf. id. at 222-24 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Delaware's substantive law interests strong). Furthermore, if defendant
expectations were dispositive, given the pre-Shaffer presumed constitutionality of Dela-
ware's sequestration statute, it is likely that the corporate directors would have expected
jurisdiction was possible over them. Id. at 227 nn.5 & 6. In sum, although Shaffer is
probably the Court's second most important "minimum contacts" personal jurisdiction
decision (behind International Shoe), and although the bulk of the opinion clarifies
"minimum contacts" operation, the actual holding of the case seems either incorrect or
incorrectly arrived at, and therefore part IV of the opinion largely should be ignored by
the Court in future personal jurisdiction decisions.
1:1 Long-arm statutes are fictions because they pretend to bring the defendant within
the control of the state when the defendant's contacts and state substantive law actually
create the possibility for jurisdiction.
I-" Long-arm statutes are redundant because they must refer to state substantive
law to determine what activities will be reached.
,"2 Long-arm statutes are irrelevant either because in reaching to the constitutional
maximum such statutes say nothing about the jurisdictional inquiry except that the state
desires to engage in it, or, as will be made clear later, because in failing to reach to the
constitutional maximum such statutes are unconstitutional. See infra notes 148-85 and
accompanying text.
I" For discussion of the difference between specific versus general jurisdiction, see
supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. The discussion in the text refers only to
contacts being self-implementing at stage one of the jurisdictional analysis. See infra
note 171.
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jurisdiction requires a special statute. Second, even if no special
jurisdictional statute is needed for specific jurisdiction assertions,
the question still remains whether a state may deliberately limit
its constitutionally permitted jurisdictional reach through what
might be called a short-arm statute.
B. Why General Jurisdiction Assertions Require No Special
Statutes
General jurisdiction, as previously stated, 124 should be seen
primarily as an exception to the preferred mode of specific
jurisdiction. Courts and commentators continue to recognize,
however, that a defendant may so purposefully, systematically,
and continuously avail himself of a forum's benefits' 25 that the
use of general jurisdiction is appropriate to bring him into that
forum to litigate causes of action generated elsewhere. 26 As with
specific jurisdiction, this Comment argues that also for general
jurisdiction, the defendant's contacts, this time his generalized
level and quality of contacts, provide notice that it is foreseeable
for him to face suit in that forum. 27 Just as in Pennoyer, when
there was no need for special statutes to justify a state's juris-
'12 See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 40.
'12 See supra notes 35, 38-40 and accompanying text.
I1"o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations,
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly
be said to be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Although the quoted
language applies clearly by its terms to assertions of specific jurisdiction, the logic of
the quote is well suited to assertions of general jurisdiction. In fact, if the beneficial
purposeful availment requirement eventually disappears from the Court's stage one
specific jurisdiction calculations, see supra note 29, it may still be a viable part of the
Court's general jurisdiction test. Defendant contacts with the forum that would make it
fair to him to be sued there on unrelated actions would seem to have to be the sort of
contacts from which he derived benefit. Otherwise his voluntary contacts with the forum
would have created only hardships, and someone voluntarily making such one-sided
detrimental contacts is difficult to imagine.
127 Of course, due process actual notice requirements would have to be met also.
See supra note 25.
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diction over those under its control, there is no need today for
a jurisdictional statute to authorize general jurisdiction.
It is also clear, however, that the state where the defendant
has systematic, continuous contacts is not constitutionally re-
quired to provide a forum for the peripatetic plaintiff who has
come to track a defendant down.'2s Since the right on which the
plaintiff sues arises under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction and
the contacts regarding the litigation are outside the forum state,
no substantive home forum laws directly related to the litigation
will trigger specific jurisdiction. 29 The state is free, absent public
policy directing otherwise, to refuse to adjudicate the dispute.
130
The rationales by which a state could choose to exercise
jurisdiction are threefold: (1) a moral belief that it would be evil
See infra text accompanying note 135.
Cf. supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (how specific jurisdiction is
implemented at stage one).
"I The state appears to be free to grant or deny jurisdiction even over its residents
or domiciliaries, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (June 25, 1948) notwithstanding. That a state almost
always chooses to affirm general jurisdiction over its residents does not negate the fact
that a choice has been made. It does indicate, though, that no special jurisdictional
statute was required for this exercise of jurisdiction.
Because jurisdictional thinking is still influenced by territorial notions that view
presence jurisdiction as natural and contacts jurisdiction as exceptional, it is difficult to
realize that the reverse is the case under "minimum contacts" analysis. Jurisdiction
because of domicile is a case in point. There is nothing obvious or necessary about such
jurisdiction under a "minimum contacts" approach. Domiciliary jurisdiction does not
always provide the plaintiff with one sure place where the defendant can be sued. For
example, some international corporations, not domiciled in the United States, might not
be capable of being sued in their home countries. The surer place where the defendant
can be sued under "minimum contacts" analysis is the place where his contacts created
the litigation. Once this stage one threshold has been passed, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a defendant to defeat stage two relative reasonableness grounds when
the plaintiff can show that there is no other guaranteed forum. See supra notes 80-82.
Choice of law problems are also more easily surmounted under specific jurisdiction. Cf.
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (sovereign immunity a valid defense where state
"domiciled," but invalid in forum where litigation related contacts occurred). Because
the usual jurisdictional thinking is "defendant can always be sued in his domicile," sight
is lost of the facts that: (1) the domiciliary state must choose to make defendant available
for suit; and (2) once the domiciliary state has control of the litigation, there is less
guarantee that the law on which the plaintiff is actually suing will be applied. When
domiciliary jurisdiction (and general jurisdiction in general) is seen as a less preferred
alternative to the specific jurisdiction facilitated by "minimum contacts," then courts
more properly will grant specific jurisdiction as the first and more desired alternative in
close cases in which both specific and general jurisdiction might be possible.
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to provide a haven for potential wrongdoers;13 1 (2) a concern
based on benefits analysis which recognizes that, because the
state has derived substantial benefits from a defendant's con-
tacts, it is fair to use the state's judicial resources to adjudicate
charges made against him;132 and (3) a convenience rationale,
which recognizes that because a defendant could be dragged
elsewhere via specific jurisdiction, it is more convenient to resi-
dent defendants or those significantly present for the state to
enable them to answer charges in their "home" states.1 33 Re-
gardless of the rationale applied, the state, as shown by Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining,134 is not compelled per se to
adjudicate claims brought under a general jurisdiction theory:
"Using the [International Shoe] tests mentioned above we find
no requirement of federal due process that either prohibits Ohio
from opening its courts to the cause of action here presented or
compels Ohio to do so.'
35
The Supreme Court's duty is to keep constitutional watch
over state assertions of general jurisdiction to insure that states
do not violate a defendant's due process rights by finding juris-
diction when there is no sufficient basis and do not discriminate
against parties by recognizing general jurisdiction in some cases
and refusing to recognize it in other similar cases. The Court
131 Cf. Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 249 S.W.2d 994 (Ark. 1952) (similar rationale
for rejecting jurisdictional restrictions on local versus transitory actions).
112 When deciding whether the state should exercise jurisdiction which it has the
power to deny, the focus should be upon why the state should expend judicial resources
it otherwise might husband on causes of action unrelated to its substantive laws and for
which specific jurisdiction probably could be obtained elsewhere.
"I At first it might be thought that because the defendant can waive jurisdictional
objections (see supra text accompanying note 65; see supra note 77), the defendant does
not need the state's permission to subject himself to jurisdiction in his "home" state.
But if the state truly has the power to grant or withhold general jurisdiction, the state
must do so non-arbitrarily by permitting jurisdiction in the same type situations for the
same type contacts. The state has basically two options: (1) it may permit defendants
who have a certain quality and nature of state contacts to waive jurisdictional objections
should they desire, or (2) it may compel all defendants who have a certain quality and
nature of state contacts to submit to jurisdiction whether or not they desire this. Only
the second option is usually thought of as general jurisdiction, but general jurisdiction
is involved in the first situation as well.
" 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
I3 ld. at 446 (emphasis in original).
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has meaningfully enforced only the first requirement, 3 6 which
was implicated in both Perkins and in Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia v. Hall. a7 The question before the Court in both
cases was whether, given a state desire for general jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant, the defendant's contacts with
that state were sufficient to sustain the assertion of general
jurisdiction.3 ' The Court answered yes in Perkins39 and no in
Helicopteros,40 implying that the level of contacts needed for
general jurisdiction is high, akin to the contacts required for
domiciliary or resident status.' 4' General jurisdiction thus rarely
will be found for non-residents, in keeping with a theory of
limited jurisdiction that prefers specific jurisdiction assertions. 42
Just as important, neither Perkins nor Helicopteros empha-
sized state jurisdictional statutes when considering whether ju-
risdiction was proper. The Court was not concerned with how
the assertion of general jurisdiction was made so long as it was
clear to the Court that the assertion could have (Perkins) or
actually had been made (Helicopteros). The Perkins Court noted
that Ohio statutes provided for notice to a non-resident corpo-
ration present within its borders, but that it was not clear to the
Court how or whether Ohio's highest court had relied on these
statutes to deny jurisdiction. 43 The Perkins test focused exclu-
-' The discrimination argument was implied in Perkins, the plaintiff claiming that
because Ohio permitted jurisdiction over nonresident natural persons, Ohio was com-
pelled to grant jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Id. at 441. The Court summarily
rejected this argument. Id. A true discrimination case would be presented when defen-
dants are nearly identical in nature and in quality of their contacts. In determining
whether quality and nature of activity in the forum in relation to fairness to the defendant
would justify general jurisdiction the nature of the defendant must be taken into account.
See supra note 40. Discrimination would occur only when the state granted jurisdiction
over one defendant and denied it over another, both defendants appearing to be of the
same type and appearing to have the same type contacts.
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
See 342 U.S. at 438; 466 U.S. at 409.
342 U.S. at 438, 446, 448.
" 466 U.S. at 418-19.
'4 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 & n.ll (1984); see also
supra notes 38 and 130.
141 See supra notes 38 & 39.
In its syllabus ... the Supreme Court of Ohio, without passing upon
the sufficiency of such acts for the above statutory purpose, and without
defining its use of the term, affirmed the judgment dismissing the com-
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sively upon adequacy of notice,' 44 and the Court nowhere spe-
cifically sought a jurisdictional statute authorizing general
jurisdiction. In Helicopteros the Court noted that the Texas
Supreme Court had interpreted, probably incorrectly, the state
specific jurisdiction long-arm statute to confer general jurisdic-
tion, 45 but the Court saw this matter of interpretation as under
state control.'
46
In neither Perkins nor Helicopteros did the Court find any
constitutional requirement for a jurisdictional statute. Although
it might be helpful for each state's legislature to decide statu-
torily whether to recognize general jurisdiction over certain types
of defendants based on the amount and quality of defendant
activity, no statute is required. State courts are capable of using
common law and interpretive principles to determine whether it
is state policy to assert general jurisdiction.1 47
and assumed that what the corporation had done in Ohio constituted
"doing business" to an extent sufficient to be recognized in reaching its
decision.
342 U.S. at 439 n.2.
Id. at 439-40.
', 466 U.S. at 412-13 & n.7. See also supra note 108 and text accompanying notes
107-10.
146 466 U.S. at 413 n.7. The U.S. Supreme Court is not always precluded from
acting by a state's interpretation of its own laws, as proved by cases such as Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) and Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,
303 U.S. 95 (1938). See also J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrruTriONA
LAW 98-99 (2d ed. 1983). When the Court feels a state is abusing its authority to be
final arbiter of its own laws in order to remove an issue from valid constitutional
consideration, the Court does not hesitate to interpret according to a federal standard
so as to again bring the constitutional issue to the forefront.
The argument could be advanced for the necessity of a long-arm statute or general
jurisdiction statute that the defendant is required by a federal standard to be put on
notice by such statute that he will be subject to the state's jurisdiction. While notice via
service of process is of course an important part of a defendant's due process rights (see
supra note 25), the Court has never held that prospective notice via a jurisdictional
reach statute is constitutionally required. This implies that the Court does not feel special
prospective statutory notice of jurisdictional reach is required under the due process
clause. If such notice were required, the Court should have invalidated interpretations
of long-arm statutes that were realistically incapable of giving such federally mandated
notice. The Court has not done this. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
Instead, the Court, in deciding whether an assertion of jurisdiction is fair, looks not to
the form by which the assertion is made, but only to whether there are contacts sufficient
to support the jurisdiction and whether or not there is provision for notice adequate to
enable the defendant to know that he must defend.
147 Cf. E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, CoNFLicT OF LAWS 313 (1982) (common law interpre-
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C. Why Short-Arm Statutes Are Unconstitutional
Perkins makes clear that a state is perfectly free not to assert
general jurisdiction even if constitutionally permitted to do so.
However, the Perkins holding that "no requirement of federal
due process ... either prohibits [a state] from opening its courts
to the cause of action here presented or compels [the state] to
do so' 4 often is removed from its general jurisdiction context,
in which it is entirely accurate, and is used inappropriately to
support the specific jurisdiction proposition that a state court
under all circumstances may close its doors to state-created
causes of action involving absent or non-resident defendants. 14
9
This Comment argues that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment 50 sometimes does compel a state to open
its courts to causes of action involving absentees and non-resi-
dents, at least for stage-one analysis.15 1 Courts and commentators
have stated otherwise, probably because of reliance on Supreme
Court statements taken out of context'- 2 and because of mistaken
notions of jurisdictional sovereignty.
tations possible); Lewis, supra note 3, at 843-46 (state courts play large role in deter-
mining state jurisdictional policy).
342 U.S. 437, 446 (emphasis altered).
"' E.g., Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 110 & n.151 (Perkins stands for proposition
that state not required to reach activities otherwise reachable by appropriate long-arm
statute); Lewis, supra note 3, at 799 n.165 ("well settled" that states can restrict reach
of their courts by jurisdictional statute). Cf. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170
F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948) (state legislature and courts have free hand to determine
jurisdiction over nonresident corporation).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'" See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (explanation of stage one analysis).
J'2 Besides Perkins, Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533
(1922) (cited in 342 U.S. at 440) is the only other Supreme Court case cited for the
proposition that a state can jurisdictionally close its doors to any or all causes of action
on whatever basis its legislature chooses. Clarendon is even weaker support for this
proposition than Perkins. The plaintiff in Clarendon claimed that he was entitled as a
matter of due process and equal protection to bring an action in Louisiana, where he
operated a railroad, for damages on a contract entered into and to be performed in
Arkansas between a Missouri corporation and a New York company. 257 U.S. at 534-
35. A purer example of shopping for a forum with no litigation related contacts but
convenient to plaintiff can hardly be imagined. See supra note 60 (why convenience
should not be a stage one jurisdiction consideration).
Describing plaintiff's contention as "frivolous," the Clarendon Court pointed out
that it would have been impossible even for a citizen of Louisiana to bring such a claim
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One earlier point should be re-emphasized briefly here. As
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee53 made clear, the due process clause jurisdictionally pro-
tects individuals, not states.154 Thus, no valid constitutional ob-
jection can prevent a state from reaching into a foreign state
and plucking out a non-resident defendant as long as such action
does not violate the defendant's personal due process rights.
However, the state does not have a completely free hand, be-
cause all states must conform to federal constitutional limits in
choosing either to exercise or not to exercise their jurisdiction. 5
One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions on a state's power
to regulate its jurisdiction illustrates this principle.
in Louisiana's courts:
The contention comes down to this .. that it is a lack of due process for
a state statute of procedure to fail to furnish a person, within the limits
of the State, power to sue a non-resident corporation and take judgment
for a cause of action arising in another state. Under § 2 of Article IV of
the Federal Constitution, the citizens of each State are entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. This secures
citizens of one State the right to resort to the courts of another, equally
with the citizens of the latter State; but where the citizens of the latter
State are not given a process for reaching foreign corporations, it is not
apparent how non-citizens can claim it. Provision for making foreign
corporations subject to service in the State is a matter of legislative discre-
tion, and a failure to provide for such service is not a denial of due
process. Still less is it incumbent upon a State, in furnishing such process
to make the jurisdiction over the foreign corporation wide enough to
include the adjudication of transitory actions not arising in the State.
257 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added). Both the Perkins and the Clarendon Courts were
confronted with situations in which the plaintiff was seeking general jurisdiction over a
defendant for "actions not arising in the state." Only in "such a case" has the Court
held that states are free to take or withold jurisdiction. Chief Justice Taft, author of
the Clarendon opinion, certainly was aware that the equal protection clause can force a
state to open its courts against its declared statutory policy, as shown in Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), a case decided the same term as Clarendon and also
authored by the Chief Justice. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
153 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
11 The Insurance Corp. of Ireland rationale was explicitly affirmed in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985). See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. For additional implica-
tions of state sovereignty and personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 186-95 and accom-
panying text.
- In this regard Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) remains solid and ground-
breaking precedent for the principle that a judgment not entitled to full faith and credit
outside the state because of lack of personal jurisdiction is also invalid within the
rendering state. See, e.g., Rheinstein, supra note 3, at 817.
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In Missouri v. Lewis,156 although the plaintiff lost his argu-
ment that Missouri deprived him of equal protection, 5 7 the
Court recognized that it is definitely possible to violate a plain-
tiff's property rights ' 8 by failing to provide him with an ac-
ceptable forum.
It is the right of every State to establish such courts as it sees
fit, and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to territorial
extent, subject-matter, and amount, and the finality and effect
of their decisions, provided it does not encroach upon the
proper jurisdiction of the United States, and does not abridge
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United
States, and does not deprive any person of his rights without
due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws, including the equal right to resort to the appro-
priate courts for redress. The last restriction, as to the equal
protection of the laws, is not violated by any diversity in the
jurisdiction of the several courts as to subject-matter, amount,
or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits
of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like
cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for
redress.159
In Lewis, the plaintiff lost because the Missouri courts were not
closed to him or to others like him for the cause of action
involved. 160 When a state enacts a short-arm statute, 16' however,
1 01 U.S. 22 (1879).
0- Plaintiff Bowman argued that Missouri discriminated against him and other St.
Louis area residents by failing to provide them with a right of direct appeal to the
Missouri Supreme Court. St. Louis area circuit court cases were appealable to a St.
Louis Court of Appeals, whose decisions were final (except in special enumerated
circumstances), while circuit court cases of other counties were appealable directly to
the state's highest court. Id. at 29. The United States Supreme Court noted that Mr.
Bowman had not been deprived of his right to appeal, that Missouri had provided him
with an appropriate forum for redress, and that no discrimination could occur as long
as residents within each territorial jurisdiction were treated fairly and equally. Id. at 33.
1'1 A plaintiff's potential cause of action is a constitutionally protected property
interest. See, e.g., 472 U.S. at 807; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428-30 (1982); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-13
(1950).
101 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
See supra note 157.
See supra text following note 123.
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it arbitrarily discriminates against certain plaintiffs by denying
them access to its courts for forum created rights.
Specific jurisdiction is validated through the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum, coinciding with the forum substantive
law. 162 No long-arm statute is needed, because the state via its
substantive laws already has manifested an intention to hold the
defendant accountable for his particular actions.'6 By enacting
a short-arm statute, however, the state arbitrarily decides not to
exercise the full extent of its already announced jurisdiction. By
recognizing a cause of action and thereby validating specific
jurisdiction,' 64 and yet also enacting a short-arm statute that
takes away this jurisdiction when certain defendants are in-
volved, the state divides its plaintiffs into two types: (1) those
who are "fortunate" enough to have tortious acts committed
upon them or contracts broken with them 65 by resident defen-
dants; and (2) those who are doubly unfortunate both in being
injured, and in having their injuries inflicted by those whom
they may not be able to reach except by general jurisdiction, if
at all.
1 66
Why a forum state would thus deliberately discriminate
against its resident plaintiffs, of course, is puzzling and gives
added support to this Comment's argument that short-arm stat-
utes generally are enacted under the mistaken belief that special
enabling legislation is needed. 167 However, assuming that a state
deliberately wished to deprive its plaintiffs of valid causes of
action, what state interests in pursuing such a policy could
outweigh the plaintiffs' deprivation of constitutionally protected
property rights? The state could not argue that it should protect
absent or non-resident defendants from litigation because the
' See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
1' Id.
'f Id.
"I Tort and contract actions are used nonexhaustively throughout this Comment
as examples of the type of actions for which plaintiffs seek recovery.
'66 The reason plaintiffs who are stuck with short-arm statutes may not be able to
reach absent defendants for forum related injuries is that general jurisdiction is at the
discretion of the foreign forum. See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text, especially
note 130.
' See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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state has no primary duty to such parties.' 6S The only reasonable
rationale for discriminating against plaintiffs would be that the
state does not want to hear the type of cases they bring to its
courts. 169 The only valid way to prohibit such cases, however, is
,, Perhaps a state might fear that it constitutionally could not reach such parties
and that such a statute would therefore be unconstitutional. Such a fear would be
groundless. Id. Unless a statute purports to hold the defendant responsible for non-
forum related contacts, the statute is at least facially valid because it operates along
constitutionally approved minimum contacts lines. Of course, the statute is also irrelevant
because the contacts related to the forum litigation confer jurisdiction, not the statute.
See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text. The statute operates at most only as an
announcement that there is a stage one filter rather than as positively determinative of
jurisdiction. See infra note 171.
The generic long-arm statute also could not be used as a shortcut protection against
collateral attack of jurisdictional decisions. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 408-09
(majority), 424-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1975) (whether durational residency require-
ment makes it less likely that ex parte divorce proceedings will be vulnerable to collateral
attack). The Sosna rationale should be seen as narrowly limited to ex parte divorce
jurisdiction situations, for the following reasons: (1) Divorce litigation involves a deter-
mination of the status of those who have a substantial connection to the state. Thus,
divorce jurisdiction does not involve specific or general jurisdiction, but something of a
hybrid, requiring the same type and level of contacts as for general jurisdiction (i.e.,
domicile), but obtained for the purpose of applying forum lav to the specific matter of
the litigation (i.e., grounds for divorce). A state is given nearly exclusive right to
determine both domicile and grounds for divorce. See, e.g., id. at 404 ("domestic
relations . . . regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States"); supra notes 128-
30 and 134-35 and accompanying text (general jurisdiction is a state's prerogative); (2)
For divorce jurisdiction, the plaintiff's rather than the defendant's minimum contacts
validate the jurisdiction (i.e., plaintiff's domicile). Additionally, (3) divorce proceedings
are often ex parte, and a defendant legitimately may wish to have his marital status
determined by the law of his domicile, and/or the state which first determined marital
status may have a legitimate interest in continuing to determine the status of either party
if either continues to reside there. Therefore, 4) ex parte divorce decrees might be more
often successfully attacked than other judgments if the attacking forum state could find
in subjective good faith that domicile really had not been obtained in the granting state.
See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Rheinstein, supra note 3.
For the above reasons, a state, as in Sosna, might be justified in setting a durational
residency requirement as a condition precedent to divorce, both on substantive law
grounds and as a protection against collateral attack. Such a requirement acts nonarbi-
trarily and nondiscriminatorily, because: it is rationally related to domiciliary status; it
applies equally to all who seek forum divorces; and it deprives no person seeking a
forum divorce of the right to eventually get that divorce. See 419 U.S. at 406. The same
is not true of a short-arm statute, which deprives those seeking application of forum
law from ever being able to have that lav applied in that forum. Rather than setting a
condition and definition on a state created right, a short-arm statute extinguishes the
state created cause of action for certain plaintiffs.
- To cut down on the number of cases heard in its courts, the state would have
to even-handedly cut off cases of both resident and nonresident plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
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to change the substantive law defining the causes of action
creating those claims.
The federal "minimum contacts" test protects against spu-
rious claims by weeding out claims truly unrelated to defendants'
contacts with the forum. 170 Weeding out on any other basis
discriminates against plaintiffs. Discrimination against plaintiffs
based on the defendant's location is particularly heinous because
it is an attribute beyond the plaintiffs' control. Plaintiffs injured
in car accidents or by exploding machinery look much the same
whether the drivers of the other cars are residents or non-
residents or whether the defective machinery was manufactured
inside or outside the state. A state should not be allowed to
prospectively cut off causes of action to such plaintiffs while
recognizing the same causes of action for other similarly situated
plaintiffs. The state should be allowed to dismiss for lack of
specific jurisdiction only when the two stage test for personal
jurisdiction is not satisfied.1
7
1
quoted portion of Clarendon at supra note 152 (privileges and immunities clause requires
equal resort to courts). In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984),
the Court stressed that a plaintiff need have no substantial ties to the forum, as long as
the defendant had sufficient litigation related contacts. Thus state policies which per se
favored resident over nonresident plaintiffs would be constitutionally suspect. Plaintiff
residence can become a factor in jurisdiction only if the plaintiff was the target of
defendant's litigation related actions (see supra note 73 and accompanying text), or if
the plaintiff's convenience becomes determinative at stage two. Either consideration
could be determined only on a case by case basis rather than through any predetermined
favoritism toward residents.
70 A state which has more liberal substantive law need not fear that it would
become a center for litigation with which it had no real interest. The stage one "minimum
contacts" test ensures that jurisdiction can be obtained only when a defendant has
litigation related contacts with the forum state. See supra text accompanying notes 77-
79, supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text, and supra notes 92-93.
M' A state without a jurisdictional reach statute would not end up with all possible
litigation related claims in its forums. The claim would still have to go through both
stages of the "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction. At stage one the
determination would be made whether defendant contacts truly were connected to the
forum. See, e.g., supra note 93. At the second stage, factors of defendant convenience
could lead to a denial of jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84. Even if
both jurisdictional hurdles were cleared, the action still might be transferred to a different
forum. See 471 U.S. at 477 & n.20 (change of venue possible within federal system is
comparable to common law forum non conveniens doctrine); 433 U.S. at 228 n.8
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If a preferable forum exists elsewhere, a State that is
constitutionally entitled to accept jurisdiction nonetheless remains free to arrange for
the transfer of the litigation under the doctrine of forum non conveniens."). This
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Additional support for this argument against the constitu-
tionality of short-arm statutes comes from two sources: one, a
line of conflicts cases, and the other a 1920's labor decision. In
Broderick v. Rosner,172 Hughes v. Fetter,7 3 and First National
Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines,174 the Supreme Court was
faced with forum states attempting, by subject matter jurisdic-
tional statutes, to close their doors to causes of action based on
foreign law. 7 - In each case, the Supreme Court ruled that,
because the local forum had in personam jurisdiction over the
parties, the local court could not deny plaintiffs access unless
some clearly defensible state policy justified that denial.1 76 Find-
Comment objects to a state foregoing this "minimum contacts" analysis by deciding
beforehand that it will under no circumstances hear possibly constitutionally valid claims
and basing this decision, not on the nature of the claim, but rather on the nature of the
plaintiff and defendant.
171 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
341 U.S. 609 (1951).
'4 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
17 In Broderick, New Jersey attempted to outlaw any in-state actions to enforce
stockholder liability which arose under another state's laws. 294 U.S. at 638. Hughes
involved a Wisconsin wrongful death statute that limited Wisconsin court jurisdiction to
"a right of action only for deaths caused in that state. . . ." 341 U.S. at 610-611. United
Air Lines was almost a repeat of Hughes, except the Illinois wrongful death statute
provided an escape clause that allowed suit in Illinois for deaths occurring out of state
if service of process could not be had on the defendant where the cause arose but could
be had in Illinois. 342 U.S. at 397.
"' A "State cannot escape its constitutional obligations... by the simple
device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise competent."
[.. T]he full faith and credit clause does not require the enforcement of
every right which has ripened into a judgment of another State or has been
conferred by its statutes .... But the room left for the play of conflicting
policies is a narrow one. One State need not enforce the penal laws of
another. ... A State may adopt such system of courts and form of remedy
as it sees fit. It may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens .... But it may not, under the guise of merely affecting the
remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of
the full faith and credit clause, when its courts have general jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties.
294 U.S. at 642-43 (quoting Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, L.O.M., 252 U.S. 411, 415
(1920)) (other citations omitted).
It is... settled that Wisconsin cannot escape this constitutional obligation
to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other
states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise
competent. We have recognized, however, that full faith and credit does
not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory
policy to a conflicting public act of another state: rather, it is for this
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ing that the state policies for exclusion were unarticulated or
weak, 17 7 the Court in each case ruled in favor of the plaintiff's
right to have his claim heard. 178 Although differently based, the
discrimination resulting from a short-arm statute is similarly
impermissible. 179 If a state can be forced to recognize that it has
Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies in-
volved. The clash of interests in cases of this type has usually been described
as a conflict between the public policies of two or more states. The more
basic conflict ... is [between the full faith and credit clause and Wiscon-
sin's public policy]. We hold that Wisconsin's policy must give way.
341 U.S. at 611-12 (footnotes omitted). 342 U.S. at 398 ("The reasons supporting our
invalidation of Wisconsin's statute apply with equal force to that of Illinois.").
In 342 U.S. at 398 ("Illinois is willing for its courts to try some out-of-state death
actions. . ."); 341 U.S. at 612 ("[visconsin] has no real feeling of antagonism against
wrongful death suits in general."); 294 U.S. at 640-41 ("But for the statute, the action
would have been entertained.... New Jersey has provided courts with jurisdiction of
suits of like nature and procedure otherwise appropriate for their determination.").
178 342 U.S. at 398; 341 U.S. at 612, 613-14; 294 U.S. at 647 ("[S]ince the New
Jersey courts possess general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and the
subject matter is not one as to which the alleged policy of New Jersey could be
controlling, the full faith and credit clause requires that this suit be entertained").
119 In the conflicts cases, jurisdiction had been obtained, and the question was
whether the state could discriminate by failing to recognize the cause of action. In the
short-arm situation the cause of action is recognized, and the question is whether the
state can discriminate by failing to grant jurisdiction.
It is worth pondering whether the Hughes situation, see supra note 175, could arise
if complete "minimum contacts" analysis were practiced by the courts. One of the
concerns in Hughes was that "Wisconsin's exclusionary statutes might amount to a
deprivation of all opportunity to enforce valid death claims created by another state."
341 U.S. at 613. Under a territorial sovereignty mentality, such a concern was valid,
because a defendant, by fleeing the territory where his litigation related contacts occurred,
effectively made himself judgment proof unless there was some way for the consequences
of his actions to follow him into the second state. The full faith and credit clause was
thus essential to compel the second state to recognize the cause of action from the first
state. Under specific jurisdiction "minimum contacts" analysis, however, it is now
possible for the original state to haul the defendant back into its own courts to answer
for causes of action which arose there. In a sense, specific jurisdiction and extraterritorial
service of process act as a form of civil extradition to bring the civil defendant back
within the control of the state for application of its civil laws.
Today, it is still possible for the original state action to be exported into the second
state via full faith and credit. Cf. Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well-Curried Leflar
Approach, 34 MERCER L. Rv. 731, 738-41, 745, 751-60, 775-76 (1983) (due process or
full faith and credit should compel forum to apply other states' laws when no specific
forum interest is served by application of own law). The type jurisdiction thus obtained
over the defendant in the second state, however, is what now would be called "general
jurisdiction." If the form of jurisdiction in the second state were specific, full faith and
credit would have no application, because the second state would be obtaining jurisdic-
[VOL. 75
19871 PERSONAL JURISDICTION
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign actions despite statutes
that claim otherwise, a state also should be forced to recognize
that it must allow jurisdictional claims that its short-arm statute
unequivocally purports to cut off. 80 Both situations discriminate
impermissibly against plaintiffs with potentially valid claims.
Additional support for the unconstitutionality of the short-
arm statute comes from Truax v. Corrigan,'5 a labor case which
held that Arizona constitutionally was not permitted to deny an
employer access to injunctive relief against striking workers, even
though an Arizona statute expressly denied this remedy for
disputes between employers and employees.8 2 In declaring the
door-closing statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that Arizona could not create in its constitution courts
capable of granting equitable relief in general and then legisla-
tively deny access to those courts based solely on the parties'
tion on the basis of its own substantive laws. Because specific jurisdiction is becoming
a more preferred form, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text and supra note
130, the plaintiff today should be able to obtain specific jurisdiction in situations such
as Hughes, although it was denied to him in the past and general jurisdiction was his
only hope for judgment. Therefore, while the full faith and credit clause will still be a
necessity for enforcement of judgments obtained elsewhere, its essentialness for obtaining
original judgments should diminish as specific jurisdiction dominates the jurisdictional
field.
',, The late Professor Brainerd Currie approached the Hughes situation consistently
with the main thesis of this Comment. According to Currie, the decisions in Hughes
and United Air Lines were supportable not by application of the full faith and credit
clause, but by application of the equal protection clause. See B. CUuuE, SELECTED
ESSAyS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 283-360 and 575-76 (1963). Currie believed the
forum state in neither case was compelled to apply the law of the foreign state, but was
free to apply its own law to the controversies. Id. at 283-330, 350. States in these cases
were compelled to hear actions based on foreign facts because withdrawal of authority
to hear the actions would have discriminated against plaintiffs in the forum state who
were entitled to the benefits of forum law. Id. at 290-311. Whether or not Currie's views
are a correct interpretation of Broderick, Hughes and United Air Lines, they apply with
full force to the discrimination against forum plaintiffs inherent in a short-arm statute.
For additional interpretations and applications of these three cases, see Brilmayer &
Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims:
Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 Va. L. Rev. 819 (1983);
Leathers, Dimensions of the Constitutional Obligation to Provide a Forum, 62 Ky. L.J.
1 (1973-74).
,' 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
I The former workers were waging an effective campaign of libel and intimidation
that was about to put the restaurant owner involved out of business. Id. at 325-29. The
Arizona door-closing statute is described at id. 322.
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employer-employee status. 183 Such discrimination violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
It is beside the point to say that plaintiffs had no vested
right in equity relief and that taking it away does not deprive
them of due process of law. If, as is asserted, the granting of
equitable remedies falls within the police power and is a matter
which the legislature may vary as its judgment and discretion
shall dictate, this does not meet the objection under the equal-
ity clause which forbids the granting of equitable relief to one
man and the denying of it to another under like circumstances
and in the same territorial jurisdiction.'4
States similarly should be prohibited from removing access to
their courts to plaintiffs who otherwise have valid substantive
law based actions. Such short-arm statutes must be deemed
unconstitutional. 185
"1 The necessary and resulting effect of these provisions ... is that the
plaintiffs in error would have had the right to an injunction against such
a campaign as that conducted by the defendants in error, if it had been
directed against the plaintiff's business and property in any kind of
controversy which was not a dispute between employer and former em-
ployees.
Id. at 331. This specific Truax holding has been modified by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15 (1970), which eliminates federal jurisdiction to issue an injunction
in a labor dispute, id. at § 107, until after a heating has determined certain specific
facts and need. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938).
The Truax Court saw removal of jurisdiction in this class of cases as arbitrary,
because it discerned no permissible basis on which a legislature could distinguish between
employers and other citizens. The Truax decision is thus based on equal protection
rationale, see infra text accompanying note 184, and that logic still applies with full
force to this Comment's short-arm argument. Whereas a state today may have a
defensible basis for discriminating between employers and other citizens, no legitimate
state policy is furthered rationally by discriminating against plaintiffs based on defendant
location. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
"4 257 U.S. at 334.
" The Court has shown willingness in three recent decisions to use the equal
protection clause to overturn state discrimination in nonsuspect classification areas. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (no legitimate state purpose
furthered by discriminatory taxing statute); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)
(impermissible discrimination against non-residents who failed to receive tax credit for
out-of-state use tax when later became residents); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 438-44 (1982) (no legitimate state purpose served by cutting off claims delayed
in processing).
Logan's separate and concurring opinions argued that, under an equal protection
rationale, the state was forbidden to divide claimants with valid claims into two groups-
[VOL.. 75
19871 PERSONAL JURISDICTION
III. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS REGARDING STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND CHOICE OF LAWS
A. Sovereignty and Forum Non Conveniens
If a state is not permitted to close its doors to plaintiffs
except by even-handedly adjusting its substantive law, 186 and if
the due process clause protects individual liberty interests rather
than state sovereignty,'6 7 how can a state prevent forum shopping
within its borders? The problem is brought into focus by ad-
justing the facts of the former Indiana/Kentucky/Ohio hypo-
thetical. 1s1 Assume as before that an Evansville, Indiana defendant
is involved in an auto accident in Columbus, Ohio with a Shel-
byville, Kentucky resident. But assume this time that both parties
later take a four month Hawaii vacation and desire to have their
Ohio accident adjudicated in a Hawaii court. If the defendant
makes no jurisdictional objection, 89 can the two parties force
Hawaii to use its judicial resources to hear a claim with which
it "has no contacts, ties, or relations"'' 9 and in which it has no
interest?
The answer is found in modification of the forum non
conveniens doctrine.' 9' The concerns of forum non conveniens
those that could recover, and those that could not-based on the length of time it took
the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission to process their claims. Id. at 438-
39, 443-44. This arbitrary method of "terminating potentially meritorious claims" was
completely unrelated to the claims' merits. Id. at 439-40. This Logan logic could be
applied to the classificatory scheme of a short-arm statute, which, to borrow Justice
Blackmun's words, "converts similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones,
and then uses this distinction as the basis for its [claim-denying] classification." Id. at
442.
See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
' ' See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
The Hawaii hypothetical may not seem a very credible possibility, but the
procedural effect is the same when the forum, for whatever reason, has no defendant
objections before it. From the forum's point of view, the same problem would be
presented if defendant failed to appear or if he made jurisdictional objections late or in
improper form.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
For discussion and application of forum non conveniens doctrine, see Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1982); Koster v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 330
U.S. 518 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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explicitly include the burdens placed not only on the defendant
but also on the court. 192 Because these burdens are distinct from
the burdens of inconvenience that might cause a defendant to
seek forum non conveniens dismissal,193 someone other than the
defendant should be able to assert them, i.e., the burdened state.
Unlike the situation for personal jurisdiction, 94 in the forum
non conveniens theory there is a true sovereignty component
which should be given valid expression. Courts should recognize
a forum non conveniens doctrine that permits dismissal upon
the initiative of the court, much as the court is required to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.191 Such dismissal
would be appropriate in situations such as the above Hawaii
192 454 U.S. at 249 ("Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where
trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the
court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience
supporting his choice." (emphasis added)).
193 In Reyno, after discussing factors that would be of primary importance to the
defendants in seeking forum non conveniens dismissal,
[tihe District Court concluded that the relevant public interests also pointed
strongly towards dismissal. The court determined that Pennsylvania law
would apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell if the case were tried in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. As a result, "trial in this forum would
be hopelessly complex and confusing for a jury." . . . In addition, the
court noted that it was unfamiliar with Scottish law and thus would have
to rely upon experts from that country. The court also found that the trial
would be enormously costly and time-consuming; that it would be unfair
to burden citizens with jury duty when the middle district of Pennsylvania
has little connection with the controversy; and that Scotland has a sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of the litigation.
454 U.S. at 243-44 (emphasis added). See also id. at 259-61 (Court approved District
Court's weighing of above public interests).
'94 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
19 See Missouri e&c rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (e.g., Jackson,
J., concurring: "Certainly a State is under no obligation to provide a court for two
nonresident parties to litigate a foreign-born cause of action when the Federal Govern-
ment, which creates the cause of action, frees its own courts within that State from
mandatory consideration of the same case." Id. at 6.); Currie, supra note 180, at 312,
320 (freedom of a state to invoke forum non conveniens in action between nonresidents
for personal injuries inflicted elsewhere), and 356-60 ("I conclude that ... a state [is
not required] to provide a forum for causes of action predicated on the law of a sister
state when the refusal to do so is grounded in good faith upon a policy of promoting
the efficiency of the local courts and protecting them against abuse."). Cf. von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 3, at 1132 ("Perhaps the only way in which undesirable forum-
shopping could be checked would be the enactment of legislation designed to encourage
refusals of jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds whenever the putative forum
had no substantial concern with the underlying controversy.").
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hypothetical in which the state has no connection to the parties
or to the litigation.
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Laws
If the argument of this Comment concerning the use of long-
arm statutes is valid, the law that confers specific jurisdiction is
also the law under which a plaintiff can sue. In most cases,
then, the forum legitimately applies its own law to controversies,
because the controversies involve the defendant's contacts with
the forum. 196 Jurisdictional and choice of law problems arise,
however, when the litigation involves not one localized contro-
versy but a series of transactions and occurrences across several
states, some of which arguably are severable from the main
I',,- Most of the Court's pronouncements concerning the relationship between per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice of laws have not been helpful. In numerous cases, the
Court has insisted that choice of law and personal jurisdiction analysis are distinct, but
has failed to clarify the differences between them. E.g., Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). Cf. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
481-82 (1985) (choice of law analysis focuses on all elements of a transaction; "minimum
contacts" stage one analysis focuses only on defendant).
There may be situations in which a plaintiff could gain specific jurisdiction under
forum substantive law and then convince the forum to apply nonforum law to his case,
but these would be limited to situations in which the non-forum law was to be applied
to only part of the claim being sued on in the forum court. Compare, e.g., Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (forum constitutionally permitted to apply forum compen-
sation remedy even though only state negligence law specifically implicated) with Babcock
v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (forum need not apply same state's law to both
negligence and compensation parts of claim when both are adjudicated in same forum).
For a more complete discussion of the complexities involved in sorting out how/whether
specific jurisdiction for one aspect of a suit entitles the forum to have jurisdiction of
and/or ability to apply its law to the entire litigation, see Cox, supra note 8. For
purposes of the argument here, however, it is enough to realize that for any single cause
of action for which the forum has specific jurisdiction, it would be almost unimaginable
for the forum to apply non-forum law. If the defendant's contacts are strongly related
to the litigation and to the forum state's interest in hearing the case as expressed by its
substantive law, a forum rarely would not choose to apply its own law to the controversy,
and an appellate court even more rarely would not be able to see clear state interest and
no defendant surprise. See also Hill, supra note 3, at 987-93 (constitutional requirements
similar for long-arm jurisdiction and choice of law); Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 78 Micr. L. REv. 872 (1980) ("minimum contacts" test for choice of
law should be nearly same as "minimum contacts" test for jurisdiction); Silberman,
supra note 3, at 87-89 (constitutionality of jurisdiction should be premised on court's
right to apply law of its state).
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controversy. When the plaintiff attempts to bring the whole suit
into one state's court, the issue becomes to what extent the
plaintiff is allowed to use forum state law as a method for
bringing other non-state claims into court.' 97
In situations in which the state court is faced with severable
claims based on several states' laws, analogy to federal court
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction should prove helpful. To the
extent aspects of a suit are so intertwined that "considerations
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants"' 93
indicate that the whole case should be heard in one action, the
court would be permitted to take jurisdiction of the entire case,
applying foreign law to foreign claims. 99 As with federal pendent
"" Under a territorial sovereignty framework the problem was not as prominent as
it should be under "minimum contacts" analysis. Since Pennoyer jurisdiction once
obtained was plenary, there was no need to explore the extent of a defendant's potential
liability as a result of physical presence within the jurisdiction. Although jurisdiction
could be invalidated if obtained by fraud of deception, see, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse,
93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Terlizzi v. Brodie, 329 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972);
Tickle v. Barton, 95 S.E.2d 427 (W.Va. 1956), and although jurisdictional immunity
might be granted to witnesses or parties in the interest of justice, see, e.g., Annot., 40
A.L.R. 93 (1926) (immunity of nonresident criminal defendant from service of process),
these exceptions to full physical power jurisdiction were narrow. Conversely, the possi-
bility of joinder of other parties involved in the same claim was limited by the extent
to which the other parties were within the physical territory of the jurisdiction, and
therefore multi-state joinder was infrequent. The threshold jurisdictional question under
a territorial framework was whether the party could be brought before the court, not
whether the claim involving the party could be heard.
Under a "minimum contacts" specific jurisdiction analysis, however, jurisdiction
is always limited, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, and the jurisdictional inquiry
is tied to the forum state's interest in the litigation. See supra note 93. Therefore,
whenever a plaintiff brings to a forum a forum substantive law based claim involving
related claims for which specific jurisdiction would be obtainable under foreign state
substantive law, the issue should always arise whether the forum has authority to hear
the related claim. For more detailed discussion of these issues, see Cox, supra note 8.
' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Gibbs is the preemi-
nent modem era Court case on pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction involves the
joinder of a state law claim to a federal question claim, while ancillary jurisdiction
involves the joinder of a claim that could not independently be brought in federal court
to a claim validly before the federal courf. Regarding power to hear such claims,
however, the issues raised by both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are nearly identical.
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("two species"
of same problem; Gibbs standards apply to both).
'11 In the federal pendent/ancillary context, although the Court has emphasized
that the limited nature of federal jurisdiction precludes the taking of certain claims, the
limitation appears to be statutory and policy based rather than strictly constitutional,
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jurisdiction, however, when "it appears that the [foreign] state
issues substantially predominate," 20° those aspects of the case
should be dismissed to the appropriate state court, or the whole
action should be stayed, on the theory that the foreign jurisdic-
tion more properly would be the place to resolve the entire
controversy.
201
CONCLUSION
The most recent United States Supreme Court personal ju-
risdiction decisions show that the Court has more fully realized
the extent to which a territorial sovereignty framework is incon-
sistent with jurisdiction based solely on "minimum contacts."
By recognizing specific jurisdiction as the usual and preferred
mode of contacts jurisdiction, 2 2 by abandoning sovereignty as
an independent counter-weight to defendants' litigation-related
contacts, 23 and by developing a two stage test for determining
reasonableness of defense in any particular forum,204 the Burger
Court established a cleaner theoretical framework in which more
clear and predictable future pronouncements concerning personal
jurisdiction can be made. The recent Asahi Metal decision con-
tinues to apply the Burger (King) framework, albeit with disa-
greement among the Justices about what contacts satisfy Burger
see 437 U.S. at 371 & n.10, 378-79, 382, Uith focus upon balancing interests rather than
on infringement of state created rights. Even in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976),
in which the Court refused to adopt the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction on the
facts before it, the Court was careful to point out that other situations might exist where
"the argument of judicial economy and convenience" could "be coupled with the
additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together,"
and that pendent party jurisdiction might be appropriate in such a case. Id. at 18. State
courts, even if they were seen as limited in their ability to hear claims which arose under
another state's laws, would still be able to apply the same judicial economy interests
and the same balancing analysis when normal specific jurisdiction analysis would not
enable them to reach all elements of the case before them.
383 U.S. at 726-27 (word inserted).
Cf. Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 711, 716-17, 720 (1979)
(jurisdictional theory should use venue rules to grant jurisdiction of complicated multis-
tate cases rather than allow litigation to be handled piecemeal).
See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 41-68 and accompanying text.
: See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
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King's stage one threshold. 205 If this Comment's argument con-
cerning long-arm statutes is valid, however, the Rehnquist Court
must houseclean still further before the Hubbardish clutter of
Pennoyer yields completely to the sleek simplicity of Interna-
tional Shoe. And as the brief speculations of Part III further
indicate, for the International Shoe "minimum contacts" test to
completely take hold will require adjustments in other closely
related areas of the law. A jurisdictional theory based solely on
contacts will force commentators, courts, and states to reanswer
very basic questions regarding the basis under which states ad-
judicate within a federal system.
Stanley E. Cox
15 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The Asahi case is given full treatment
in the article there cited. The author's primary argument is that the Court, if it had
focused on choice of law and personal jurisdiction questions simultaneously, could have
produced a less divided and confused decision. While the Asahi holding, denial of
jurisdiction, was correct, the decision was an opportunity missed to clarify personal
jurisdiction's interrelatedness to choice of law.
[VOL. 75
